Located in southern Senegal, between Gambia and Guinea Bissau, the Casamance region has since the early 1980s been rocked by a separatist conflict between the Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance (Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance, MFDC) and the Senegalese state. Recent developments appear to have dramatically altered the balance of power in West Africa’s most longstanding conflict.
Since early 2021, the Senegalese authorities have launched a series of military offensives against the MFDC rebels. In March 2022, the Senegalese army opened a new front in northern Casamance, in the department of Bignona. The objective of this operation, according to a statement released by the Ministry of Armed Forces, was to dismantle the bases of one MFDC faction led by Salif Sadio, stressing the need to ensure ‘territorial integrity’, as well as to eliminate all criminal groups carrying out illicit activities in the area.1 Ministry of the Armed Forces, Communiqué de presse: Opération de sécurisation en Zone militaire n°5, March 2022, https://www.forcesarmees.gouv.sn/communiques/operation-de-securisation-en-zone-militaire-ndeg5. Close footnote
The Casamance separatists have long been involved in numerous illicit economies, exploiting the abundance of natural resources in the country’s southern region to finance their operations. Contested state control has been one enabling factor for the emergence of Casamance as a key transit point for a wide range of illicit flows between Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Gambia, including cocaine.2 For further analysis of the role played by the Casamance region in subregional illicit ecosystems, see Lucia Bird, West Africa’s cocaine corridor: Building a subregional response, GI-TOC, April 2021, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/west-africas-cocaine-corridor. Close footnote Mehdi Ba, Senegal: When timber trafficking fuels rebellion in Casamance, The Africa Report, 13 July 2022, https://www.theafricareport.com/218403/senegal-when-timber-trafficking-fuels-rebellion-in-casamance. Close footnote
However, the rebels have been significantly weakened by law enforcement action against them since 2021. Across West Africa, armed actors targeted by military operations have increasingly turned to national parks as fallback zones. For example, the W-Arly-Pendjari (WAP) complex in the tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Benin and Niger has long operated as a fallback zone and safe haven for Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (Group to Support Islam and Muslims) elements, resting after offensives from international actors in Mali.
Will the decisive military offensives, and weakening of traditional fallback areas in Guinea-Bissau and Gambia, mark the beginning of the end for the MFDC? Or will the rebels merely displace geographically, searching for alternative sources of funding? If the latter, will the regional trend be replicated here, and will Niokolo Koba, one of the largest national parks in West Africa located fewer than 400 kilometres from the Casamance region, become the armed group’s new home?
Created in 1947, the MFDC was founded as a political party, before becoming a separatist movement in 1982, seeking independence for the Casamance region.4 Perspective Monde, Début d’un conflit dans la région de la Casamance, au Sénégal, Université de Sherbrooke, 26 December 1982, https://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMEve/1260. Close footnote Africa24, Sénégal: un accord de paix signé entre l’Etat et la rébellion casamançaise, 9 August 2022, https://africa24tv.com/senegal-un-accord-de-paix-signe-entre-letat-et-la-rebellion-casamancaise/. Close footnote
A January 2021 Senegalese offensive against the rebel factions in the south led to the dismantling of at least three rebel bases, known respectively as ‘2’, ‘9’ and ‘Sikoun’.6 Pauline Le Troquier, Rébellion. En Casamance, une offensive de l’armée sénégalaise violente mais passée sous silence, Courier International, 5 February 2021, https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/rebellion-en-casamance-une-offensive-de-larmee-senegalaise-violente-mais-passee-sous-silence. Close footnote Le Monde, L’armée sénégalaise annonce avoir pris le contrôle de trois bases rebelles en Casamance, 10 February 2021, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2021/02/10/l-armee-senegalaise-annonce-avoir-pris-le-controle-de-trois-bases-rebelles-en-casamance_6069479_3212.html. Close footnote
A March 2022 offensive in the northern area of the Casamance, in the Bignona department, targeted rebel bases scattered on the border with Gambia. A key objective of the operation was also to put an end to the illicit trafficking of timber in the Casamance region.8 Mamadou Alpha Diallo, L’offensive de l’armée va t-elle fragiliser les acquis de la paix en Casamance?, DW, 23 March 2022, https://www.dw.com/fr/sénégal-casamance-rebelles-offensive-militaire/a-61239094. Close footnote Including those in Bakingaye, Djilanfale, Guikess, Katama, Katinoro, Karounor, Tampindo/Kanfounda and Younor. See Ouestaf, Sénégal: l’armée veut en finir avec le MFDC, 24 March 2022, https://www.ouestaf.com/senegal-larmee-veut-en-finir-avec-le-mfdc/. Close footnote Le Quotidien, Bilan de la mission de sécurisation en Casamance: les rebelles désertent de leurs factions, 23 March 2022, https://lequotidien.sn/bilan-de-la-mission-de-securisation-en-casamance-les-rebelles-desertent-de-leurs-factions/. Close footnote Interview with a specialist of the Casamance conflict, September 2022. Close footnote
Figure 1 Senegalese military offensives against MFDC rebels.
Source: Data drawn from available media sources.
Since the early 2000s, MFDC rebels have been tapping into the natural resources available in the Casamance region to finance their operations. The trafficking of timber from the forests of Casamance has been the group’s main source of funding.12 Mouhamadou Kane, The silent destruction of Senegal’s last forests, ENACT, January 2019, https://enactafrica.org/enact-observer/the-silent-destruction-of-senegals-last-forests. Close footnote Interview with a University of Assane Seck, Ziguinchor, lecturer and expert in the Casamance conflict and timber trafficking, September 2022. Close footnote
The MFDC rebels granted timber licences to Senegalese and Gambian traffickers, a prerogative that should belong exclusively to the Senegalese state.14 Interview with a water and forest agent in Casamance, February 2021. Close footnote Environmental Investigation Agency, Cashing-in on chaos: How traffickers, corrupt officials, and shipping lines in The Gambia have profited from Senegal’s conflict timber, June 2020, https://content.eia-global.org/assets/2020/06/EIA-Cashing-In-On-Chaos-HiRes.pdf. Close footnote Ibid. Close footnote
In the past, rebels could easily retreat to Guinea-Bissau or Gambia when there were clashes with the Senegalese army, as they enjoyed the protection of important actors in both countries. Yahya Jammeh, the long-time ruler of Gambia, was reportedly one of the biggest supporters of the Casamance rebels.17 Lucia Bird and A. Gomes, Deep-rooted interests: Licensing illicit logging in Guinea-Bissau, GI-TOC, May 2021, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/illicit-logging-guinea-bissau/. Close footnote Goree Institute, Casamance: aux sources du conflit, 14 February 2022, https://goreeinstitut.org/casamance-aux-sources-du-conflit/. Close footnote
The regime changes in Gambia in 2017 and Guinea-Bissau in 2021, which brought Adama Barrow and Umaro Sissoco Embaló to power respectively, redefined the balance of power and offered an important advantage to the state of Senegal in its operations against the Casamance rebels. The close relationship of Macky Sall, president of the Senegalese republic, to both leaders has translated into greater ability for Senegalese troops to pursue rebels into traditional havens in Guinea-Bissau and Gambia.19 President Embaló granted unprecedented (and controversial) permission to Senegalese troops to pursue rebels into Bissau-Guinean territory in March 2021. For further discussion of President Embaló’s decision, and the possible links between this permission and the reported attempted coup in Bissau in February 2022, see Lucia Bird, Cocaine politics in West Africa: Guinea-Bissau’s protection networks, GI-TOC, July 2022, (https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/GITOC-WEA-Obs-Cocaine-politics-in-West-Africa-Guinea-Bissaus-protection-networks.pdf. Since 2019, Senegalese security forces have exercised the right to pursue illicit loggers who have acted illegally in the Casamance, in Gambia; see BBC, Trafic de bois: le Sénégal exerce un droit de poursuite en Gambie, 11 May 2018, https://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-44082923. Close footnote
Following the dismantling of their bases, seizure of their weapons and weakening of traditional havens, the MFDC’s ability to translate territorial influence into revenue streams from illicit economies may be weakened. For now, the MFDC rebels appear to have no intention of laying down their arms. A specialist of the Casamance conflict told the GI-TOC that he believes the rebels will return sooner or later.20 Interview with a University of Assane Seck, Ziguinchor, lecturer and expert in the Casamance conflict and timber trafficking, September 2022. Close footnote
The Niokolo Koba National Park offers significant opportunities to the rebels as a new fallback zone. Located in south-eastern Senegal in the region of Tambacounda, on the banks of the Gambia River, Niokolo Koba National Park is one of the largest parks in West Africa, with an area of 913 000 hectares.21 UNESCO, Niokolo-Koba National Park, https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/153/. Close footnote
The Niokolo Koba National Park, one of the largest parks in West Africa.
Photo: BSIP/Universal Images Group via Getty Images
Figure 2 Niokolo Koba National Park as an illicit hub.
Source: Lucia Bird and Lyes Tagziria, Organized crime and instability dynamics: Mapping illicit hubs in West Africa, GI-TOC, September 2022, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/GITOC-WEAObs-Organized-crime-and-instability-Mapping-illicit-hubs-in-West-Africa-1.pdf
Boasting an abundance of natural resources and rich in biodiversity, while strategically located close to the border with Mali and Guinea, the Niokolo Koba National Park could offer numerous possibilities to rebel groups to draw revenues from illicit activities they have long relied on, including the illicit trade in timber, cannabis and wildlife products. Furthermore, the geographic configuration of the park, presenting access difficulties, heavy forests stymying air surveillance, and a low level of on-land surveillance (only 164 rangers patrol the entire park), makes the park an obvious choice for armed groups to conceal themselves and launch attacks of their own.22 Interview with a park official, August 2022. Close footnote
Niokolo Koba is already often subject to incursions by unidentified armed groups, some believed to have crossed the border from Mali.23 Ibid. Close footnote Ibid. Close footnote Aislinn Laing, LRA warlord Joseph Kony uses ivory trade to buy arms, The Telegraph, 12 January 2016,https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/joseph-kony/12066467/LRA-warlord-Joseph-Kony-uses-ivory-trade-to-buy-arms.html. Close footnote
Furthermore, owing to a strong belief in the mystical virtues of these hunting spoils, the skins of certain animals can be sold for between FCFA500 000 and FCFA1 200 000 (US$750–US$1 800), depending on the size and type of animal.26 Interview with an investigator from an NGO specializing in fauna crime in Senegal, July 2022. Close footnote Ibid. Close footnote
Gold mines in the park could also offer a source of revenue. According to the Senegalese authorities,28 Interview with security and mining authorities, Dakar and Kédougou, February 2021 to August 2022. Close footnote Abdoulaye Barro, Exploitation illégale d’or à Bandé Ethiess, la Gendarmerie de Kédougou arrete 20 personnes, Sudestinfo, 3 June 2019, https://sudestinfo.com/exploitation-illegale-dor-a-bande-ethiess-la-gendarmerie-de-kedougou-arrete-20-personnes/. Close footnote
A boom in artisanal gold mining throughout large parts of the Sahel region over the past decade has provided new revenue streams for conflict actors, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso.30 Peter Tinti, Whose crime is it anyway? Organized crime and international stabilization efforts in Mali, GI-TOC, February 2022, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Whose-crime-is-it-anyway-web.pdf. Close footnote
In countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger, military and law enforcement action against violent extremist groups and other armed groups has seen these groups retreat into national parks, such as the Comoé National Park and the WAP complex. These national parks are used by armed groups as strategic sanctuaries and as bases from which to launch attacks.31 Lucia Bird and Lyes Tagziria, Organized crime and instability dynamics: Mapping illicit hubs in West Africa, GI-TOC, September 2022, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/GITOC-WEAObs-Organized-crime-and-instability-Mapping-illicit-hubs-in-West-Africa-1.pdf. Close footnote Ibid. Close footnote
It is clear, therefore, that the Niokolo Koba National Park is an area at risk of being exploited by MFDC separatists. However, that the rebels are likely to be able to engage in illicit activities predicated on the natural resources of the national park, providing them with much-needed financial resources, is not the only risk. As has been experienced in in other parts of West Africa, not just in Côte d’Ivoire as outlined above but in the Sahel region too, jihadist groups have used national parks and wildlife reserves as a means to ingratiate themselves with the local population by allowing residents to engage in economic activity prohibited by the state, including logging and artisanal gold mining.33 Peter Tinti, Whose crime is it anyway? Organized crime and international stabilization efforts in Mali, GI-TOC, February 2022, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Whose-crime-is-it-anyway-web.pdf. Close footnote
Ministry of the Armed Forces, Communiqué de presse: Opération de sécurisation en Zone militaire n°5, March 2022, https://www.forcesarmees.gouv.sn/communiques/operation-de-securisation-en-zone-militaire-ndeg5.
For further analysis of the role played by the Casamance region in subregional illicit ecosystems, see Lucia Bird, West Africa’s cocaine corridor: Building a subregional response, GI-TOC, April 2021, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/west-africas-cocaine-corridor.
Mehdi Ba, Senegal: When timber trafficking fuels rebellion in Casamance, The Africa Report, 13 July 2022, https://www.theafricareport.com/218403/senegal-when-timber-trafficking-fuels-rebellion-in-casamance.
Perspective Monde, Début d’un conflit dans la région de la Casamance, au Sénégal, Université de Sherbrooke, 26 December 1982, https://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMEve/1260.
Africa24, Sénégal: un accord de paix signé entre l’Etat et la rébellion casamançaise, 9 August 2022, https://africa24tv.com/senegal-un-accord-de-paix-signe-entre-letat-et-la-rebellion-casamancaise/.
Pauline Le Troquier, Rébellion. En Casamance, une offensive de l’armée sénégalaise violente mais passée sous silence, Courier International, 5 February 2021, https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/rebellion-en-casamance-une-offensive-de-larmee-senegalaise-violente-mais-passee-sous-silence.
Le Monde, L’armée sénégalaise annonce avoir pris le contrôle de trois bases rebelles en Casamance, 10 February 2021, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2021/02/10/l-armee-senegalaise-annonce-avoir-pris-le-controle-de-trois-bases-rebelles-en-casamance_6069479_3212.html.
Mamadou Alpha Diallo, L’offensive de l’armée va t-elle fragiliser les acquis de la paix en Casamance?, DW, 23 March 2022, https://www.dw.com/fr/sénégal-casamance-rebelles-offensive-militaire/a-61239094.
Including those in Bakingaye, Djilanfale, Guikess, Katama, Katinoro, Karounor, Tampindo/Kanfounda and Younor. See Ouestaf, Sénégal: l’armée veut en finir avec le MFDC, 24 March 2022, https://www.ouestaf.com/senegal-larmee-veut-en-finir-avec-le-mfdc/.
Le Quotidien, Bilan de la mission de sécurisation en Casamance: les rebelles désertent de leurs factions, 23 March 2022, https://lequotidien.sn/bilan-de-la-mission-de-securisation-en-casamance-les-rebelles-desertent-de-leurs-factions/.
Interview with a specialist of the Casamance conflict, September 2022.
Mouhamadou Kane, The silent destruction of Senegal’s last forests, ENACT, January 2019, https://enactafrica.org/enact-observer/the-silent-destruction-of-senegals-last-forests.
Interview with a University of Assane Seck, Ziguinchor, lecturer and expert in the Casamance conflict and timber trafficking, September 2022.
Interview with a water and forest agent in Casamance, February 2021.
Environmental Investigation Agency, Cashing-in on chaos: How traffickers, corrupt officials, and shipping lines in The Gambia have profited from Senegal’s conflict timber, June 2020, https://content.eia-global.org/assets/2020/06/EIA-Cashing-In-On-Chaos-HiRes.pdf.
Lucia Bird and A. Gomes, Deep-rooted interests: Licensing illicit logging in Guinea-Bissau, GI-TOC, May 2021, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/illicit-logging-guinea-bissau/.
Goree Institute, Casamance: aux sources du conflit, 14 February 2022, https://goreeinstitut.org/casamance-aux-sources-du-conflit/.
President Embaló granted unprecedented (and controversial) permission to Senegalese troops to pursue rebels into Bissau-Guinean territory in March 2021. For further discussion of President Embaló’s decision, and the possible links between this permission and the reported attempted coup in Bissau in February 2022, see Lucia Bird, Cocaine politics in West Africa: Guinea-Bissau’s protection networks, GI-TOC, July 2022, (https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/GITOC-WEA-Obs-Cocaine-politics-in-West-Africa-Guinea-Bissaus-protection-networks.pdf. Since 2019, Senegalese security forces have exercised the right to pursue illicit loggers who have acted illegally in the Casamance, in Gambia; see BBC, Trafic de bois: le Sénégal exerce un droit de poursuite en Gambie, 11 May 2018, https://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-44082923.
Interview with a University of Assane Seck, Ziguinchor, lecturer and expert in the Casamance conflict and timber trafficking, September 2022.
UNESCO, Niokolo-Koba National Park, https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/153/.
Aislinn Laing, LRA warlord Joseph Kony uses ivory trade to buy arms, The Telegraph, 12 January 2016,https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/joseph-kony/12066467/LRA-warlord-Joseph-Kony-uses-ivory-trade-to-buy-arms.html.
Interview with an investigator from an NGO specializing in fauna crime in Senegal, July 2022.
Interview with security and mining authorities, Dakar and Kédougou, February 2021 to August 2022.
Abdoulaye Barro, Exploitation illégale d’or à Bandé Ethiess, la Gendarmerie de Kédougou arrete 20 personnes, Sudestinfo, 3 June 2019, https://sudestinfo.com/exploitation-illegale-dor-a-bande-ethiess-la-gendarmerie-de-kedougou-arrete-20-personnes/.
Peter Tinti, Whose crime is it anyway? Organized crime and international stabilization efforts in Mali, GI-TOC, February 2022, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Whose-crime-is-it-anyway-web.pdf.
Lucia Bird and Lyes Tagziria, Organized crime and instability dynamics: Mapping illicit hubs in West Africa, GI-TOC, September 2022, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/GITOC-WEAObs-Organized-crime-and-instability-Mapping-illicit-hubs-in-West-Africa-1.pdf.
Peter Tinti, Whose crime is it anyway? Organized crime and international stabilization efforts in Mali, GI-TOC, February 2022, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Whose-crime-is-it-anyway-web.pdf.