Gang violence in Haiti: The first anniversary of Viv Ansanm.

Between December 2024 and February 2025, Haiti witnessed another surge in gang violence, worsening already dire security and humanitarian crises. Data from late 20241

UN Integrated Office in Haiti, Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, October–December 2024. Close footnote

to early 2025 paints a harrowing picture: during that period, 1 732 people were killed, 411 injured and 431 kidnapped – bringing the total number of abductions in 2024 to 1 494. Meanwhile, more than 1 million people – including 700 000 children – totalling approximately 9% of Haiti’s population, were displaced. Thousands fled in response to mass killings and attacks. Additionally, in Cité Soleil and Croix-des-Bouquets, groups including the 400 Mawozo, the Taliban Gang and Terre Noire gangs specifically targeted police families by torching their homes.

A deeper shift towards governance

Since the formation of the gang coalition of Viv Ansanm in February 2024, violence has remained widespread, but gangs have adapted their tactics to better consolidate power. This shift demonstrates increased organization, as gangs are now focusing more on establishing sustained economic control over communities.

This unprecedented merger aimed to consolidate power among Port-au-Prince’s most important gangs, enabling them to coordinate operations more effectively and expand their influence. Over the past year, Viv Ansanm has asserted control in new areas expanding to the Artibonite, the northern border to the Dominican Republic, and areas of the south-west, significantly reshaping the country’s security landscape. ​

The coalition’s ability to maintain internal cohesion, despite historical rivalries, stems from shared objectives and a unified front against external interventions, such as the UN-backed mission led by Kenyan police. Their coordinated efforts have led to a decrease in infighting, allowing them to focus on expanding territorial control and challenging state authority. This unity contrasts sharply with the Haitian government’s struggle to work together to establish order, highlighting the gangs’ adaptability and strategic alliances in the face of political instability.​

In areas including Cité Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets and Tabarre, gangs have reduced7

Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Gangs’ expansion and the pressure on public security strategies, Risk Bulletin, Issue 2, GI-TOC, November 2024. Close footnote

their indiscriminate attacks, allowing displaced residents to return, and increasing their extortion profits from local merchants or farmers. Comparatively, gangs such as the 103 Zombies, Grand Ravine and Ti Bois in Carrefour and Gressier have continued8

Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains, Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond, 28 February 2025. Close footnote

to aggressively expand their territory through attacks on the south-east regions of Kenscoff and Furcy.

Beyond the exertion of physical control, as the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime documented throughout the year 2024,9

For more publications on extortion and protection rackets in Haiti, see Haiti ObservatoryClose footnote

gangs have turned to extortion as a primary revenue stream.10

Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Risk Bulletin, Issue 2, GI-TOC, November 2024. Close footnote

This ability to make racketeering the foundation of their business model has transformed the political economy of violence. Extortion is directly linked to the gangs’ current ability to make their territorial and social control the foundation of a broader governance, within which systematic extortion is deployed. Within the territories controlled by the gangs, but also on the country’s main roads, as well as around port or border infrastructures, the criminal groups continue to impose a tax on all those active in their fiefdoms.

As we documented in January 2025,11

Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Last chance? Breaking Haiti’s political and criminal impasse, GI-TOC, January 2025. Close footnote

this dynamic is at the heart of the gangs’ territorial consolidation, but also of their desire to expand – including in the Kenscoff areas – in recent months. Each advance by the gangs leads not only to an explosion of violence, but also to the creation of local cells with one or more leaders, one of whose main tasks is to establish a local extortion regime, particularly against businesses in the area, residents in some cases, and also against people wishing to travel on the highways, through the immediate creation of checkpoints.

In addition, and this is an issue that will need to be monitored in 2025, extortion by criminal groups has become widespread in rural areas, sometimes in a less visible or at least less documented way than in the capital. This is particularly the case in Artibonite and the central plateau. In Artibonite, gangs have targeted farmers, traders and markets, enforcing so-called protection fees and seizing goods. The Gran Grif gang, under pressure from joint operations of the Haitian National Police and the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, has begun extorting smaller communities such as Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite and Dessalines.12

In Port-au-Prince, extortion now also affects businesses and public officials, further undermining state authority.13

Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Last chance? Breaking Haiti’s political and criminal impasse, GI-TOC, January 2025. Close footnote

This shift has prompted gangs facing pressure from the police to rely less on crimes such as kidnappings, allowing them to further insert themselves within local economies and making it more difficult to dismantle them.

Expansion of gangs in Haiti as of March 2025.

Figure 1 Expansion of gangs in Haiti as of March 2025.

Gridlocking Port-au-Prince

The gangs have strategically resettled in different areas, allowing them to control economic activities and impose their own local governance structures. These tactics play a critical role in gangs’ ability to manoeuvre towards communes like Kenscoff, a high-value target and a crucial stepping stone to Pétion-Ville – the economic and political hub of Port-au-Prince.14

Kenscoff’s strategic importance cannot be overstated. A semi-rural mountainous commune located about 16 kilometres south-east of Port-au-Prince, on top of the city, Kenscoff has traditionally been a haven for the upper-middle class and a logistical buffer zone between the capital and more secure regions. In February, members of the 5 Segond gang in Village de Dieu, led by Johnson ‘Izo’ André, went door to door, indiscriminately opening fire and setting homes ablaze.15

Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains, Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond, 28 February 2025. Close footnote

The small communes of Belot, Furcy, Obléon, Godet and Le Montcel also fell victim to gangs seeking to control Kenscoff.16 In response to the attacks, which have resulted in dozens of fatalities, Haitian authorities have issued arrest warrants for individuals accused of supporting gangs attacking Kenscoff.17 Among the suspects are former Senator Nenel Cassy and former Kenscoff legislator Alfredo Antoine.

Despite these arrests, the dismantling of political-criminal relationships remains a distant prospect. And while the progress of judicial investigations remains opaque, they leave little hope for a transparent outcome that would shed light on the mechanisms that support criminal groups.

Gangs have expanded into the commune of Kenscoff, nestled in the mountains south-east of Port-au-Prince.

Figure 2 Gangs have expanded into the commune of Kenscoff, nestled in the mountains south-east of Port-au-Prince.

Moreover, by infiltrating areas of Kenscoff, from which almost 2 000 people have fled, criminal groups have established footholds in previously unoccupied territories, creating forward operating bases to push towards Haiti’s last financial and political epicentre, Pétion-Ville.18

The attacks on Kenscoff, in addition to the pressure placed on Pétion-Ville, also illustrate the gangs’ desire to take control of one of the few roads around the capital that remains out of their hands. This is likely to be with the broader goal of being able to set up checkpoints there and extend their extortion capabilities, in addition to their territorial and social control.

While public forces and the MSS mission do not seem able to repel or reconquer the mountain areas taken by the gangs, these criminal operations suggest that the capital will end up being completely encircled by the armed groups. In addition to the consolidation of the gangs’ power, this situation poses an even greater risk to the movement of displaced persons and the latent humanitarian catastrophe in Port-au-Prince, a situation that currently seems to be out of control.

Notes

  1. UN Integrated Office in Haiti, Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, October–December 2024. Back to text

  2. Ibid. Back to text

  3. Ibid. Back to text

  4. Ibid. Back to text

  5. Ibid. Back to text

  6. Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains, Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond, 28 February 2025. Back to text

  7. Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Gangs’ expansion and the pressure on public security strategies, Risk Bulletin, Issue 2, GI-TOC, November 2024. Back to text

  8. Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains, Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond, 28 February 2025. Back to text

  9. For more publications on extortion and protection rackets in Haiti, see Haiti ObservatoryBack to text

  10. Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Risk Bulletin, Issue 2, GI-TOC, November 2024. Back to text

  11. Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Last chance? Breaking Haiti’s political and criminal impasse, GI-TOC, January 2025. Back to text

  12. Onès Joseph, Haiti’s Artibonite announces new sercurity measures after new gang attack in Dessalines left 3 dead, multiple injuries and homes set ablaze, The Haitian Times, 29 November 2024. Back to text

  13. Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Last chance? Breaking Haiti’s political and criminal impasse, GI-TOC, January 2025. Back to text

  14. Evens Sanon, Gangs attack a neighborhood in Haiti that’s home to the country’s elite, Associated Press, 4 February 2025. Back to text

  15. Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains, Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond, 28 February 2025. Back to text

  16. HaitiLibre, Haiti – FLASH: Kenscoff attacked, attackers repelled, 28 January 2025. Back to text

  17. Juhakenson Blaise, Police target 16 ‘dangerous’ high profile figures with gang ties, including ex-lawmakers accused of destabilizing regions of Haiti, The Haitian Times, 19 February 2025. Back to text

  18. Evens Sanon, Gangs attack a neighborhood in Haiti that’s home to the country’s elite, Associated Press, 4 February 2025. Back to text