The Transitional Presidential Council struggles for political legitimacy in the face of growing insecurity.

Haiti’s persistent security crisis has prompted political developments under the guidance of the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC), although it has often struggled to implement its strategies. To address the deteriorating security situation and pave the way for possible elections, the TPC announced in January 2025 the creation of a war council designed to direct substantial resources toward combating criminal groups and improving public safety.¹ The plan includes allocating substantial funds for the Haitian National Police.

Part of the responsibilities of the TPC also include establishing the Provisional Electoral Council (PEC) — tasked with organizing long-delayed presidential elections.

A critical step in restoring democratic governance in Haiti is the effective functioning of the nine-member PEC. The constitutionally mandated body’s primary duties include voter registration, candidate approval, enforcing electoral laws and certifying election results.

The TPC has emphasized the need to hold elections to restore legitimate governance, but Haiti’s worsening security situation could severely hinder voter turnout and election credibility. TPC President Leslie Voltaire has stated that only eight of Haiti’s 10 departments may be able to hold elections in November 2025; the Artibonite and West Departments may be unable to participate due to insecurity in those areas.² As a result, an estimated up to 60% of the eligible voting population may be unable to vote.³ This poses a significant challenge to holding free and fair elections. Meanwhile, concerns remain over how to ensure the safety of candidates, voters and election workers.

Haitian elections have historically been marred by allegations of fraud, low voter turnout and external interference, resulting in deep-seated distrust in the political system. Political violence and corruption further undermine legitimacy, with past elections tainted by the suppression of opposition groups, bribery and vote tampering.⁴ With gangs controlling 85% of Port-au-Prince, the fairness of any election is highly questionable.

Moreover, in such a climate of violence, elections can act as a catalyst rather than a moment of appeasement. Until security conditions are restored — at least minimally — and the Haitian institutions responsible for organizing and overseeing the proper conduct of the elections are not consolidated, it seems premature — and even dangerous — to embark on a timetable that could quickly become untenable.

Finally, it seems essential, in parallel with the normal electoral procedures, to work on designing a strategy to avoid the direct or indirect participation of armed groups in the elections. Whether through pressure, threats, extortion or direct violence against the population or candidates, it is likely that the gangs will try to influence the democratic calendar. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that, in line with what has been regularly documented in Haiti, criminal groups will form an alliance with competing candidates and parties, thus contributing to the systematization of political-criminal collusion, as well as to the risk of political violence.

Figure 1 Key events in Haiti, January–March 2025.

Notes