Are Haitian gangs on the road to political recognition?

One of the most significant developments so far in 2025 has been the rise of Viv Ansanm as it seeks political recognition. The group, which was formed through the merger of rival factions G9 and G-Pèp, now controls nearly 85% of Port-au-Prince.

On 2 January 2025, Viv Ansanm’s leader, Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier, announced the group’s transformation into a political party.¹ In his address shared on social networks, Chérizier accused the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) — established in 2024 to replace Ariel Henry, who took over as acting prime minister following the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse — of corruption and incompetence.² Chérizier called for reducing the TPC from nine to three members, arguing that a smaller, more streamlined council would improve governance and echoing sentiments made by the Engagés pour le Développement and Fanmi Lavalas political parties.³ Chérizier also framed Viv Ansanm not as a criminal syndicate, but a movement representing Haiti’s marginalized communities, and pushed for its inclusion in future peace talks and electoral discussions.

Although these statements should be taken as part of Chérizier’s public communication for at least a year, several indications provided by the criminal leader suggest a desire to go beyond showy acts and put even more pressure on the political context. For example, Chérizier took care to detail a timetable for the construction of a political structure linked to Viv Ansanm.

Some TPC members have reportedly considered recognizing Viv Ansanm as a political entity; as of February 2025, discussions regarding the recognition of the coalition as such have been marked by differing viewpoints.⁴ Leslie Voltaire, then-president of the TPC and an affiliate of the Fanmi Lavalas party, has expressed strong opposition to forming any alliance with Viv Ansanm. Voltaire described a document, which was sent to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and which mentioned the coalition’s position, to be an ‘unacceptable alliance’.⁵ ‘The fact that any members of the government are considering allowing Viv Ansanm to operate as a political party is like letting the devil in your bed. We cannot actively denounce gang violence while letting them have a political standing,’ remarked a representative for the TPC in an interview with the GI-TOC.⁶

The differing viewpoints within the TPC underscore the sensitivities associated with recognizing gangs as legitimate actors in Haiti’s transitional governance. On the one hand, political integration could provide an incentive for criminal groups to disarm and transition into governance. On the other hand, integration could formalize violent existing gang-controlled power structures, preventing the emergence of a legitimate government system and potentially harm efforts to address the grievances of marginalized communities.

Ultimately, Haiti faces a critical decision. Beyond the political communication adopted by the gangs — and the fractures within the TPC and the government on the stance to adopt in the face of the potential transformation of armed groups into political factions — gang leaders are able to put decisive pressure on the political transition. This situation demands stakeholders to move away from commentary and scandals, such as the one that led to Viv Ansanm signing the official document sent to CARICOM, and develop real institutional policy on how to demobilize or dismantle criminal groups in the future.

This process cannot be carried out without broad political and social consultation, and must be conducted with the utmost transparency to avoid any informal dealings between the political sector and the armed groups. Any proposed solution should involve a clear state policy that enables Haiti to make progress in resolving the insecurity crisis, but also to chart the path to a judicial strategy.

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