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Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti
Summary highlights
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Gangs’ expansion and the pressure on public security strategies.
Gang attacks carried in and out of Port-au-Prince are putting immense pressure on the Haitian National Police (HNP) and the Multinational Security Support (MSS) forces. Since its deployment in June 2024, the mission has faced challenges as great as the expectations it has raised among the Haitian population and the importance it has assumed in the eyes of the international community. Although it is still too early to draw definitive conclusions, the MSS has not yet enabled the HNP to reverse the balance of power with the gangs. By land, the capital remains just as isolated from the rest of the country, with gangs controlling the main highways and having driven up the cost of extortion on the transport of goods, particularly in the Canaan area, an essential passageway to the north and centre of the country. Meanwhile, the total closure of the Gressier area, a unique gateway to the south, has isolated a third of the country, which now depends on coastal shipping for its supplies.
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The centrifugal dynamics of violence in Port-au-Prince.
The territorial facets of violence in Haiti are marked by a strong centrifugal dynamic. Since July 2024, gang violence has risen at the limits of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, particularly in Ganthier, under attack by the 400 Mawozo gang, and Gressier. In October, the spread of violence was dramatically accentuated by a massacre committed by the Gran Grif Gang in Artibonite. The gangs’ attacks show a desire to expand their reach for strategic reasons, including territorial control, arms and drug trafficking, and greater influence over larger populations and resources. Faced with this challenge, the MSS mission and the HNP are still unable to respond to the opening of multiple fronts or to occupy the field over the medium term. These operational shortcomings benefit the gangs who continue, to a large extent, to play cat-and-mouse with the forces of law and order.
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Homicides are falling, but gang pressure keeps rising.
The current state of violence in Haiti offers two hard truths. While data from April to June shows a 45% decrease in homicides compared with the previous quarter, this has not resulted in improved living conditions or long-term stability for Haitians, especially in areas that remain under gang control. In qualitative terms, gangs in Haiti continue to exert enormous pressure on the communities living under their control, a dynamic illustrated in particular by the large increase in rape and gender-based violence figures, as well as population displacement.
About this issue
The second issue of the Risk Bulletin of Violence and Resilience in Haiti aims to highlight the geographical and social evolution of gang violence and the challenges it poses for the responses of national authorities and the international community. It also shows that, despite the statistical decline in violence between March and September 2024, the structural conditions that underpin it, namely the social dominance of gangs and their ability to resume fighting, remain intact.
Since the Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission deployed to Haiti in June 2024, it has faced challenges on a scale commensurate with public expectations of the mission and its growing importance on the world stage. In particular, the issue of funding and logistical support remains a key obstacle to the mission’s full operational capability. Although it is still too early to draw conclusions, and while reinforcements are expected to arrive soon, the MSS mission has not yet enabled the Haitian National Police (HNP) to reverse the balance of power against the gangs. The main reason for this is the lack of financial and technical support from UN member states — with the exception of the US, Canada and, to a much lesser extent, France. Without financial support, it is impossible for the mission to accomplish the task for which it was deployed.
The gangs still control more than 80% of the Port-au-Prince, as well as the main roads leading to the capital, isolating it from the rest of the country and making the smooth transport of goods or the movement of people dependent on the collection of extortion money and the goodwill of armed groups. If the latter decide to close down certain routes or block certain infrastructure nodes, as was the case with the international port of Port-au-Prince between September and October 2024, it is illusory to think that the public forces will be able to prevent them.
Added to this logic is the renewed territorial expansion of violence outside the capital. While gangs, vigilante groups and other armed entities have been present and active outside Port-au-Prince for several years, this dynamic has taken a new turn in recent months. Since July 2024, gang violence has increased considerably on the outskirts of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, particularly in Ganthier, towards the Dominican Republic, and in Gressier, an obligatory gateway to the south-west of the country. In October, the spread of violence was dramatically accentuated by a massacre committed by the Gran Grif gang in Artibonite. Attacks by gangs reflect a desire to expand their hold for strategic reasons: control of territory and local populations, arms and drug trafficking, influence and control over larger legal markets and resources.
This territorial evolution poses an enormous operational challenge for the public forces. Indeed, neither the MSS mission nor the HNP seem capable of responding to the opening up of simultaneous fronts scattered across the country. This is due to human, technical and logistical shortcomings, as well as to the difficulty of the public forces to project themselves quickly, inside or outside the capital, and to occupy the terrain in the medium or long term. These operational shortcomings benefit the gangs, who continue to play a game of cat and mouse with the public forces, catching police operations off guard or nullifying their efforts by retaking disputed territories as soon as the officers leave.
These developments reveal a country locked in a dual reality. Although data from April to June shows a 45% drop in homicides compared with the previous quarter, and while we await future consolidated figures, this has not translated into improved living conditions or long-term stability for Haitians. This is even less the case for those living in areas still under gang control. While some areas of the country have been able to take advantage of the relative calm to return to a more normal life — with schools reopening, some commercial and economic dynamism returning, and freedom of movement regained — the rest of the country suffers from direct or indirect gang pressure, and the devastating impact of violence on social, economic and professional life. Finally, even in areas controlled by criminal groups, where clashes may have subsided in the last six months, in qualitative terms, the gangs continue to exert enormous pressure on the communities living under their control, as illustrated by the sharp increase in rape and gender-based violence, as well as population displacement.
These lines of analysis illustrate how the Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti strives to offer a political economy panorama of violence in the country, in a context of high political tension and uncertainty.