Homicides are falling, but gang pressure keeps rising.

The current state of violence in Haiti, and to a larger extent in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, offers two hard truths. While April to June country-level statistics show a 45% decrease in homicides compared to the previous quarter,¹ this has not translated into improved living conditions or long-term stability for the entire population of Haiti, or the capital.

In Port-au-Prince, two territorial and social realities coexist almost in parallel. The metropolitan area is divided in two, between those living under the direct control of the gangs and the rest of the population. In qualitative terms, gangs continue to exert enormous pressure on the populations living under their control, a dynamic illustrated in particular by the explosion in rape and gender-based violence (GBV) figures, as well as population displacement.

In fact, gangs’ control over populations and territories cannot be measured solely by homicide rates or attacks. Criminal groups can maintain order and, to a certain extent, calmness, within the territories they control, thereby reducing the number of deadly attacks, while the systemic effects of their domination persist or even expand. Therefore, while the decline in homicides is encouraging, there are several dynamics that need to be studied to better understand the situation.

First, the decline in homicides during Q2 is linked to the absence of inter-gang violence since the February 2024 relaunch of Viv Ansanm (Living Together, in Haitian Creole), a gang coalition that seeks to present a unified criminal front. Unlike previously, when gangs operated in continually conflicting capacities, Viv Ansanm has united multiple factions under a shared agenda. Since its revival, Viv Ansanm has fuelled gangs’ capacity for mutual collaboration and institutionalization.²

Despite reported tensions and confrontations between certain groups, particularly in September, the end of the clashes has enabled gangs to shift their strategic focus, improve the management of their members and resources — particularly weapons and ammunition — and exert more extensive and coordinated control over larger areas. The revival of Viv Ansanm has led to a more unified approach to criminal governance, replacing the fragmented and conflictual regulation enforced by individual gangs.

Secondly, the number of direct confrontations between gang members and Haiti’s police has also decreased. Following the cat-and-mouse dynamic of confrontations, this can be seen as a tactical decision on behalf of the gangs. By reducing the number of direct attacks against law enforcement, gangs may lessen the immediate threat of retaliatory operations, which can destabilize their control over the territories they dominate. This allows them to focus on consolidating their power within these zones without drawing much attention from national and international actors.

Thirdly, Viv Ansanm’s strengthened territorial control has allowed the gangs to expand their ability to extort and impose protection rackets, further embedding the gangs within Haiti’s socio-economic and political structures. Moreover, the long-standing installation of checkpoints, as well as the imposition of rules that regulate people’s movements, demonstrate the gangs’ ability to assert their authority over daily life. This system is part of a larger territorialization effort, where violence is deployed to maintain order and build sovereignty.

Additionally, there has been a shift in the patterns of violence in several gang-controlled zones. While the underlying issues that perpetuate instability and suffering remain unresolved, truces have been brokered in the past months. On 25 July 2024, a ceasefire was reached between rival gangs in the neighbourhoods of Brooklyn, Belekou and Boston, in the Cité Soleil area in Port-au-Prince.³ The July 2024 truce marked a temporary cessation of hostilities and slightly improved living conditions for local residents.⁴

The agreement principally led to the destruction, by the gangs themselves, of roadblocks, walls (called VAR, in Haitian Creole) and checkpoints, and a public and private effort to collect garbage and sanitize neighbourhoods, allowing residents greater freedom of movement. The isolated neighbourhood of Brooklyn, in particular, has regained easier access to water supplies and food. Before the removal of the roadblocks, residents were unable to leave and were forced to rely on people from surrounding neighbourhoods to bring in supplies, often at great personal risk.

However, the situation in Cité Soleil remains precarious. Previous truces, including one in July 2023,⁵ collapsed shortly after they were established. Despite the relative calm, the area faces serious challenges, including the presence of active gangs and harsh living conditions in the aftermath of widespread destruction — some areas still resemble urban war zones. In an interview in September 2024, a resident of Cité Soleil reported that the area has remained relatively calm since the July 2024 truce, although residents still lack humanitarian access and resources, such as safe drinking water and food, which can only be found outside the community. A coordinator of a Haitian non-governmental organization referred to the current state of affairs as ‘a negative peace’, indicating the reduction of direct violence while the underlying causes of the conflict and the absence of a reconciliation and justice process remain unresolved.⁶

In fact, violent clashes broke out on 12 September between the Simon Pelé and Boston groups. In the context of the end of a soccer tournament, and under conditions that are still unclear, armed men allegedly opened fire.⁷ The crossfire and executions reportedly left dozens dead, with no final official toll having been made public. Interviews conducted with local residents also mention the tracking down of residents in the hours following the clashes, as well as displaced persons.

Figure 1 Gang violence in Haiti, 2018–2024.

Source: José Luengo-Cabrera, with data from ACLED

Figure 2 Trends in food inflation in Haiti.

Source: José Luengo-Cabrera, with data from the World Bank

These acts of violence demonstrate the fragility of the situation and the gangs’ ability to reactivate violent practices from one moment to the next. The system of social control imposed by gangs is not arbitrary — it is part of a broader strategy of territorialization, where violence is used to enforce discipline and order. Violence is also used as a deterrent, creating an atmosphere of fear and unpredictability. Public displays of violence, such as massacres and the mutilation of bodies, are particularly effective in enforcing control, leading to mass displacements and migration. Kidnappings, extortion and public executions are often used to maintain order within their territories. These extreme acts of violence not only terrorize the local population, but also demonstrate the gang coalition’s power to rival factions and public authorities altogether, reinforcing its dominance.

In this way, the Viv Ansanm coalition has effectively positioned itself as a criminal institution, and a mechanism for the regulation of violence. Viv Ansanm members have used violence not just as a tool of repression, but also as a means to establish and maintain a social order that benefits their interests. Through a combination of coercion, economic regulation and public displays of power, the coalition has created a controlled environment where it can more easily dictate the terms for inhabitants.

This increase in community-targeted violence has enormous social and humanitarian implications. Mass displacement occurs as people flee danger, which disrupts local economies and exacerbates poverty. The violence also weakens the community’s trust in the state and its law enforcement agents, as the perceived absence or ineffectiveness of the police contributes to a sense of abandonment and vulnerability.

Currently, over 578 000 people are displaced across Haiti, with a 60% increase between March and June 2024; of those, more than 112 000 are living in 96 informal sites scattered throughout the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.⁸ These sites, often located in schools, churches and sports fields, suffer from shortages of water and sanitation facilities, such as latrines, creating perilous living conditions that heighten the risk of waterborne diseases.

Figure 3 Haitian refugees and internally displaced people in Haiti, 2003–2023.

Source: José Luengo-Cabrera, with data from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Figure 4 Internally displaced people in Haiti, by location and gender.

Source: José Luengo-Cabrera, with data from UNHCR

More than 30 medical centres and hospitals have shut down owing to vandalism and looting.⁹ The largest hospital in the area, the State University of Haiti Hospital, was closed until efforts in June 2024 by the Haitian National Police helped resecure it, allowing it to reopen.¹⁰ Meanwhile, press reports say that only about 20% of hospitals in Port-au-Prince are operating normally.¹¹

Médecins Sans Frontières (or Doctors Without Borders), has highlighted the severe impact of gang violence on mental health and access to social services in gang-controlled areas. In these areas, often referred to as ‘red zones’, residents face significant barriers to accessing essential services as a result of the constant threat of violence, fear and stigma.¹² This environment exacerbates mental health issues, as individuals are frequently exposed to traumatic events and chronic stress. Additionally, the presence of rival gangs can make it nearly impossible for people to reach healthcare facilities, further isolating them from necessary medical and social support.

The past few months have also seen a marked increase in rapes and instances of GBV. According to a GI-TOC interview with a humanitarian officer, before the onset of violence in February 2024, international health facilities treated an estimated 10 rape cases per month. That number has increased to more than 40 victims per month since then, with many patients having previously been treated for GBV.¹³

These figures should be treated with caution. According to several humanitarian sources consulted in Port-au-Prince, victims under-report instances of sexual violence, as they often fear retaliation or lack trust in the justice system,¹⁴ which is weakened by attacks on justice personnel and a minimal police presence. Under-reporting also indicates a form of social violence that perpetuates control even after the initial attack, and affects mental and physical health. Access to treatment for GBV survivors is severely limited, exacerbating the physical and psychological trauma they experience.¹⁵

Victims of GBV may also choose not to report the crime to the authorities, but rather to local gang leaders whom they view as the authority in their neighbourhoods, invested with more power than the formal judicial process.¹⁶ The impact of GBV on the community is profound, as pervasive fear and trauma disrupt social cohesion, hinder economic activities and perpetuate a cycle of violence and instability.

Given these complex, intertwined dynamics of violence, the fall in reported homicides cannot be considered a sign of systemic progress in securing the capital. On the contrary, it accentuates the capacity of Haitian gangs to dominate and govern, and underscores the urgent need to deal with structural conditions, direct support, smuggling networks and the politico-criminal relations that support them.

Notes