The centrifugal dynamics of violence in Port-au-Prince.

The territorial nature of violence in Haiti exhibits a strong centrifugal dynamic. Since July 2024, gang violence has risen outside the limits of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, particularly in Ganthier, 30 kilometres east of the capital, under attack by the 400 Mawozo Gang, and in Gressier, 20 kilometres west of the capital.1

In early October 2024, this dynamic took an even more dramatic turn when the Gran Grif Gang carried out one of the largest massacres the country has seen in decades. In the commune of Pont-Sondé, a commercial hub of Artibonite, 100 kilometres north of the capital, the gang executed men, women and children, looted and destroyed houses, and forced more than 6 000 inhabitants to flee the area. Estimates put the death toll at around 109.2 According to initial reports, the Haitian national police, stationed just 20 kilometres from Pont-Sondé, failed to intervene during the attack.3

These gang attacks show a will to expand influence for strategic reasons related to territorial control, drug and arms trafficking, and to increase their influence over larger populations and resources.4

On 29 July 2024, the 400 Mawozo gang launched an assault on Ganthier that resulted in widespread destruction, including of the local police station. Another attack by the group on 15 August 2024 forcedly displaced 6 000 residents amid house burnings, kidnappings and robberies.5 The group’s assault followed a failed attempt by Haitian forces on 25 July to curb the 400 Mawozo gang’s influence in neighbouring Croix-des-Bouquets, illustrating their resilience and strategic planning.6

Ganthier is a rural community located on Road 8, around 20 kilometres from the Malpasse border crossing with the Dominican Republic and on a key axis to the country’s south. The roads there, and the region in general, are used for smuggling weapons, drugs and other contraband, such as firearms.7 In 2023, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime identified Malpasse as a critical passage for drugs out of the country due to its poorly monitored, mountainous terrain bordering the Dominican Republic.8 Firearms have been tracked entering the Dominican Republic and then being transported to Haiti using formal and informal border crossings, including the Jimaní-Malpasse crossing.9

The events in Ganthier expose the ongoing struggle between Haitian security forces and the 400 Mawozo gang, highlighting the complexities and limitations of current intervention strategies. Despite a planned operation on 25 July 2024 that involved both Haitian police and Kenyan officers from the MSS mission, they failed to establish lasting control over the area. The gang’s rapid reoccupation of Ganthier, coupled with their subsequent assaults, demonstrates their strategic adaptability and emphasizes the challenge that Haitian and international security forces face in sustaining security gains. This scenario underscores the need for a reassessment of tactical approaches, more robust support and deeper community engagement to counter the gang’s entrenched presence and mitigate its impact on local populations.

Meanwhile, to the south, gangs have continued to expand their control over areas in Gressier and Carrefour. These attacks have displaced more than 4 400 people since May 2024.10 Additionally, 46 women and girls have been sexually abused, with police rescuing 23 of them during an operation in July.11

Ganthier and Gressier are strategically important locations for the gangs. Situated on the western edge of Port-au-Prince, Gressier provides a critical gateway to the capital, making it an asset for controlling movement in and out of the city. The town’s location on National Route 2, a major transport route, allows gangs to exert influence over trade and logistics, and to facilitate the smuggling of goods.12 The southern departments are also critical drug and firearm trafficking routes for the gangs.13

Despite promises to act, state interventions have been minimal, and the gangs have taken control of public markets, businesses and transportation, imposing tolls on a short stretch of road.

Aside from the intense violence in Artibonite and Carrefour, gang attacks in Gressier and Ganthier illustrate the expanding reach of criminal groups. Such attacks are helping to transform the landscape of clashes and population displacements. By expanding into other departments, gangs seek to control more territory, which allows them to exert influence over larger populations and resources, and make them more formidable players in Haiti’s economic and political spheres.14 Moreover, the gangs usually expand to regions that offer resources such as agricultural products, trade routes and other economic assets to exploit. Controlling these areas allows gangs to generate more income through extortion, taxation or direct involvement in local economies.

The timing of these attacks also shows how gang factions use offensive tactics to test the Haitian National Police and Multinational Security Support mission’s capacity to respond.

Notes

  1. Juhakenson Blaise, Gangs continue to rule and expand their grip on Haiti as authorities promise action, The Haitian Times, 26 August 2024. 

  2. Death toll rises to 109 after Haiti gang attack, official says, RFI, 10 October 2024. 

  3. Jean Junior Célestin, Massacre de Pont-Sondé : le bilan s’alourdit, Le Nouvelliste, 4 October 2024. 

  4. David C. Adams and Andre Paultre, Sidestepping deployed Kenyan forces, Haiti gangs continue reign of terror, The New York Times, 11 August 2024. 

  5. The Soufan Center, Recurrent gang violence proving a difficult cycle to break in Haiti, 15 August 2024. 

  6. David C. Adams and Andre Paultre, Sidestepping deployed Kenyan forces, Haiti gangs continue reign of terror, The New York Times, 11 August 2024. 

  7. UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Haiti’s criminal markets: Mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking, 2023. 

  8. Ibid. 

  9. UN Integrated Office in Haiti, Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, January–March 2024. 

  10. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Haiti emergency situation report No. 23 (as of 16 May 2024), 17 May 2024. 

  11. Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains, Murders, rapes, looting, and arson in Carrefour and Gressier under the indifferent gaze of the new state authorities, 15 August 2024. 

  12. UN Integrated Office in Haiti, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Security Council, 15 January 2024. 

  13. UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Haiti’s criminal markets: Mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking, 2023. 

  14. David C. Adams and Andre Paultre, Sidestepping deployed Kenyan forces, Haiti gangs continue reign of terror, The New York Times, 11 August 2024.