

OBSERVATORY OF VIOLENCE AND RESILIENCE IN HAITI

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Summary highlights



Gangs' expansion and the pressure on public security strategies.

Gang attacks carried in and out of Port-au-Prince are putting immense pressure on the Haitian National Police (HNP) and the Multinational Security Support (MSS) forces. Since its deployment in June 2024, the mission has faced challenges as great as the expectations it has raised among the Haitian population and the importance it has assumed in the eyes of the international community. Although it is still too early to draw definitive conclusions, the MSS has not yet enabled the HNP to reverse the balance of power with the gangs. By land, the capital remains just as isolated from the rest of the country, with gangs controlling the main highways and having driven up the cost of extortion on the transport of goods, particularly in the Canaan area, an essential passageway to the north and centre of the country. Meanwhile, the total closure of the Gressier area, a unique gateway to the south, has isolated a third of the country, which now depends on coastal shipping for its supplies.



The centrifugal dynamics of violence in Port-au-Prince.

The territorial facets of violence in Haiti are marked by a strong centrifugal dynamic. Since July 2024, gang violence has risen at the limits of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, particularly in Ganthier, under attack by the 400 Mawozo gang, and Gressier. In October, the spread of violence was dramatically accentuated by a massacre committed by the Gran Grif Gang in Artibonite. The gangs' attacks show a desire to expand their reach for strategic reasons, including territorial control, arms and drug trafficking, and greater influence over larger populations and resources. Faced with this challenge, the MSS mission and the HNP are still unable to respond to the opening of multiple fronts or to occupy the field over the medium term. These operational shortcomings benefit the gangs who continue, to a large extent, to play cat-and-mouse with the forces of law and order.





Homicides are falling, but gang pressure keeps rising.

The current state of violence in Haiti offers two hard truths. While data from April to June shows a 45% decrease in homicides compared with the previous quarter, this has not resulted in improved living conditions or long-term stability for Haitians,

especially in areas that remain under gang control. In qualitative terms, gangs in Haiti continue to exert enormous pressure on the communities living under their control, a dynamic illustrated in particular by the large increase in rape and gender-based violence figures, as well as population displacement.

ABOUT THIS ISSUE

The second issue of the Risk Bulletin of Violence and Resilience in Haiti aims to highlight the geographical and social evolution of gang violence and the challenges it poses for the responses of national authorities and the international community. It also shows that, despite the statistical decline in violence between March and September 2024, the structural conditions that underpin it, namely the social dominance of gangs and their ability to resume fighting, remain intact.

Since the Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission deployed to Haiti in June 2024, it has faced challenges on a scale commensurate with public expectations of the mission and its growing importance on the world stage. In particular, the issue of funding and logistical support remains a key obstacle to the mission's full operational capability. Although it is still too early to draw conclusions, and while reinforcements are expected to arrive soon, the MSS mission has not yet enabled the Haitian National Police (HNP) to reverse the balance of power against the gangs. The main reason for this is the lack of financial and technical support from UN member states – with the exception of the US, Canada and, to a much lesser extent, France. Without financial support, it is impossible for the mission to accomplish the task for which it was deployed.

The gangs still control more than 80% of the Port-au-Prince, as well as the main roads leading to the capital, isolating it from the rest of the country and making the smooth transport of goods or the movement of people dependent on the collection of extortion money and the goodwill of armed groups. If the latter decide to close down certain routes or block certain infrastructure nodes, as was the case with the international port of Port-au-Prince between September and October 2024, it is illusory to think that the public forces will be able to prevent them.

Added to this logic is the renewed territorial expansion of violence outside the capital. While gangs, vigilante groups and other armed entities have been present and active outside Port-au-Prince for several years, this dynamic has taken a new turn in recent months. Since July 2024, gang violence has increased considerably on the outskirts of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, particularly in Ganthier, towards the Dominican Republic, and in Gressier, an obligatory gateway to the south-west of the country. In October, the spread of violence was dramatically accentuated by a massacre committed by the Gran Grif gang in Artibonite. Attacks by gangs reflect a desire to expand their hold for strategic reasons: control of territory and local populations, arms and drug trafficking, influence and control over larger legal markets and resources.

This territorial evolution poses an enormous operational challenge for the public forces. Indeed, neither the MSS mission nor the HNP seem capable of responding to the opening up of simultaneous fronts scattered across the country. This is due to human, technical and logistical shortcomings, as well as to the difficulty of the public forces to project themselves quickly, inside or outside the capital, and to occupy the terrain in the medium or long term. These operational shortcomings benefit the gangs, who continue to play a game of cat and mouse with the public forces, catching police operations off guard or nullifying their efforts by retaking disputed territories as soon as the officers leave.

These developments reveal a country locked in a dual reality. Although data from April to June shows a 45% drop in homicides compared with the previous quarter, and while we await future consolidated figures, this has not translated into improved living conditions or long-term stability for Haitians. This is even less the case for those living in areas still under gang control. While some areas of the country have been able to take advantage of

the relative calm to return to a more normal life — with schools reopening, some commercial and economic dynamism returning, and freedom of movement regained — the rest of the country suffers from direct or indirect gang pressure, and the devastating impact of violence on social, economic and professional life. Finally, even in areas controlled by criminal groups, where clashes may have subsided in the last six months, in qualitative terms, the gangs continue to exert enormous pressure on the

communities living under their control, as illustrated by the sharp increase in rape and gender-based violence, as well as population displacement.

These lines of analysis illustrate how the Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti strives to offer a political economy panorama of violence in the country, in a context of high political tension and uncertainty.

Gangs' expansion and the pressure on public security strategies.

Gang attacks carried out far from downtown Port-au-Prince are putting immense pressure on the Haitian National Police (HNP) and Multinational Security Support (MSS) forces. Since its deployment in June 2024, the mission has faced challenges as great as the expectations it creates among the population and the importance it assumes in the eyes of the international community.

Although it is still too early to draw definitive conclusions, the MSS has not yet enabled the HNP to reverse the balance of power with the gangs. By land, the capital remains just as isolated from the rest of the country, with gangs controlling the main highways, while having driven up the cost of extortion on the transport of goods, particularly in the Canaan area, an essential passageway to the north and centre of the country. Meanwhile, the total closure of the Gressier

area, a unique gateway to the south of Haiti, has isolated a third of the country, which now depends on coastal shipping for its supplies.

From an operational and tactical point of view, the police and the MSS are faced with several decisions. First and foremost is their capacity – or inability – to deploy men, which has been singled out for criticism, particularly during the gang attacks on Ganthier (see story 2). Public security forces are still not in a position to deploy and maintain a constant presence in order to hold the territory. This is due to the dangerous nature of the environment, the lack of human and technical resources available to the HNP and the MSS, and the strategy adopted by the gangs, especially since March 2024, of systematically destroying public infrastructure – mainly police stations and barracks –




FIGURE 1 Expansion of gangs in Haiti.

Sources: Field information collected by the GI-TOC and data produced in collaboration with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime

in controlled or conquered territories. The public forces have nowhere to settle in safety.

In this context, the MSS mission and HNP are forced into offence-defence operations with gangs, without being able to occupy the terrain for more than a few days at a time. These operational shortcomings benefit the gangs, who continue to challenge public security forces. In Ganthier, for example, the gangs returned to

the town several times, carrying out further expulsions of the population and extensive urban destruction. They then started to construct a double barrier wall on the national road leading to Ganthier with the aim of preventing public forces from advancing into the area. Although the HNP seems to have succeeded in intervening and destroying the encroaching wall, it remains to be seen how the situation develops, and what the gangs' attitude will be to the public forces.

KEY FIGURES

Number of homicides or injuries, January to March 2024: 2 500.

Between 1 April and 30 June 2024, at least 1 379 people were killed or injured. This represents a 45% drop in killings and gunshot wounds and a 2% drop in kidnappings compared with Q1 of 2024.¹

Between 1 January and 30 June 2024, OHCHR documented that at least 2 652 people had been killed (2 221 men, 363 women, 52 boys and 16 girls) and 1 280 others injured (920 men, 295 women, 47 boys and 16 girls) as a result of gang violence in the country.

Rate of internally displaced persons: 60% increase, March to June 2024.

Number of individuals facing emergency levels of food insecurity: 1.64 million.

Percentage of children active in gangs: 30%–50%.

Proportion of households that lack macro- and micro-nutrient requirements: 65%.

Meanwhile, media outlets have pointed to difficulties in coordinating between the HNP and the MSS mission. This is said to be due to language and communication problems, with Haitian sources complaining of Kenyans speaking English or Swahili during operations. There is also, apparently, resentment among some Haitian troops towards the foreign agents' better living conditions and higher pay.² In this context, several sources have emphasized the importance of making efforts to better coordinate between the HNP and the MSS mission, including at the police agent level, on top of senior officer or management level.

Difficult as it may be, it is essential to build trust and collaboration between the HNP and the MSS. This is especially important at times when other countries are preparing to deploy forces to Haiti, adding to the mix of nationalities, languages and operational cultures present

in the country. In terms of overall coordination of operations, it is essential that the HNP and Haitian government, embodied by Prime Minister Garry Conille in his additional role as minister of the interior, have the capacity to draw up short- and medium-term strategies, and implement them on the ground, with their partners.

This appears to have been more the case in the interior of Port-au-Prince since late August and early September. The government had made a point of launching operations against gangs in the particularly tense Solino district. These operations, carried out over several consecutive days in September, seemed to have stabilized the front against the gangs in Bel Air, in the heart of the capital. During a field visit, the GI-TOC observed that the police had created a buffer zone between Bel Air and Solino - destroying numerous houses in the process - and thus eased the pressure on

Solino exerted by the criminal groups. This buffer zone did not, however, prevent stray bullets from being fired in September and October, resulting in several victims, followed by massive gang attacks on the Solino district from 17 October onwards, displacing over 5 000 people.

Finally, the HNP, the government and the MSS mission continue to be caught up in a communication war against criminal groups. Until mid-July, it was difficult to discern a coordinated communication strategy among the various public institutions, as each seemed to be pulling its own strings. This contributed to exacerbating the vacuum created by the lack of

strategic communication that had existed since the previous government, and into which the gangs rushed, saturating social networks and certain media with videos and interventions by their leaders. To counter this phenomenon, the HNP, the government and the MSS mission have stepped up their communication efforts. This is a positive development. Institutional communication cannot mask or replace the victories, however modest, that the HNP and MSS need to turn the tide against the gangs, but better communication on the objectives and results of their police operations is essential to establish their legitimacy with the Haitian population.

Notes

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The centrifugal dynamics of violence in Port-au-Prince.

The territorial nature of violence in Haiti exhibits a strong centrifugal dynamic. Since July 2024, gang violence has risen outside the limits of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, particularly in Ganthier, 30 kilometres east of the capital, under attack by the 400 Mawozo Gang, and in Gressier, 20 kilometres west of the capital.¹

In early October 2024, this dynamic took an even more dramatic turn when the Gran Grif Gang carried out one of the largest massacres the country has seen in decades. In the commune of Pont-Sondé, a commercial hub of Artibonite, 100 kilometres north of the capital, the gang executed men, women and children, looted and destroyed houses, and forced more than 6 000 inhabitants to flee the area. Estimates put the death toll at around 109.² According to initial reports, the Haitian national police, stationed just 20 kilometres from Pont-Sondé, failed to intervene during the attack.³

These gang attacks show a will to expand influence for strategic reasons related to territorial control, drug and arms trafficking, and to increase their influence over larger populations and resources.⁴

On 29 July 2024, the 400 Mawozo gang launched an assault on Ganthier that resulted in widespread destruction, including of the local police station. Another attack by the group on 15 August 2024 forcedly displaced 6 000 residents amid house burnings, kidnappings and robberies.⁵ The group's assault followed a failed attempt by Haitian forces on 25 July to curb the 400 Mawozo gang's influence in neighbouring Croix-des-Bouquets, illustrating their resilience and strategic planning.⁶

Ganthier is a rural community located on Road 8, around 20 kilometres from the Malpasse border crossing with the Dominican Republic and on a key axis to the country's south. The roads there, and the region in general, are used for smuggling weapons, drugs and other contraband, such as firearms.⁷ In 2023, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime identified Malpasse as a critical passage for drugs out of the country due to its poorly monitored, mountainous terrain bordering the Dominican Republic.⁸ Firearms have been tracked

entering the Dominican Republic and then being transported to Haiti using formal and informal border crossings, including the Jimani-Malpasse crossing.⁹

The events in Ganthier expose the ongoing struggle between Haitian security forces and the 400 Mawozo gang, highlighting the complexities and limitations of current intervention strategies. Despite a planned operation on 25 July 2024 that involved both Haitian police and Kenyan officers from the MSS mission, they failed to establish lasting control over the area. The gang's rapid reoccupation of Ganthier, coupled with their subsequent assaults, demonstrates their strategic adaptability and emphasizes the challenge that Haitian and international security forces face in sustaining security gains. This scenario underscores the need for a reassessment of tactical approaches, more robust support and deeper community engagement to counter the gang's entrenched presence and mitigate its impact on local populations.

Meanwhile, to the south, gangs have continued to expand their control over areas in Gressier and Carrefour. These attacks have displaced more than 4 400 people since May 2024.¹⁰ Additionally, 46 women and girls have been sexually abused, with police rescuing 23 of them during an operation in July.¹¹

Ganthier and Gressier are strategically important locations for the gangs. Situated on the western edge of Port-au-Prince, Gressier provides a critical gateway to the capital, making it an asset for controlling movement in and out of the city. The town's location on National Route 2, a major transport route, allows gangs to exert influence over trade and logistics, and to facilitate the smuggling of goods.¹² The southern departments are also critical drug and firearm trafficking routes for the gangs.¹³

Despite promises to act, state interventions have been minimal, and the gangs have taken control of public markets, businesses and transportation, imposing tolls on a short stretch of road.

Aside from the intense violence in Artibonite and Carrefour, gang attacks in Gressier and Ganthier illustrate the expanding reach of criminal groups. Such

attacks are helping to transform the landscape of clashes and population displacements. By expanding into other departments, gangs seek to control more territory, which allows them to exert influence over larger populations and resources, and make them more formidable players in Haiti's economic and political spheres.¹⁴ Moreover, the gangs usually expand to regions that offer resources such as agricultural products, trade routes and other economic assets to

exploit. Controlling these areas allows gangs to generate more income through extortion, taxation or direct involvement in local economies.

The timing of these attacks also shows how gang factions use offensive tactics to test the Haitian National Police and Multinational Security Support mission's capacity to respond.

Notes

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- 2 Death toll rises to 109 after Haiti gang attack, official says, RFI, 10 October 2024.
- 3 Jean Junior Célestin, *Massacre de Pont-Sondé : le bilan s'alourdit*, *Le Nouvelliste*, 4 October 2024.
- 4 David C. Adams and Andre Paultre, Sidestepping deployed Kenyan forces, Haiti gangs continue reign of terror, *The New York Times*, 11 August 2024.
- 5 The Soufan Center, Recurrent gang violence proving a difficult cycle to break in Haiti, 15 August 2024.
- 6 David C. Adams and Andre Paultre, Sidestepping deployed Kenyan forces, Haiti gangs continue reign of terror, *The New York Times*, 11 August 2024.
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- 11 Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains, Murders, rapes, looting, and arson in Carrefour and Gressier under the indifferent gaze of the new state authorities, 15 August 2024.
- 12 UN Integrated Office in Haiti, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Security Council, 15 January 2024.
- 13 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Haiti's criminal markets: Mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking, 2023.
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Homicides are falling, but gang pressure keeps rising.

The current state of violence in Haiti, and to a larger extent in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, offers two hard truths. While April to June country-level statistics show a 45% decrease in homicides compared to the previous quarter,¹ this has not translated into improved living conditions or long-term stability for the entire population of Haiti, or the capital.

In Port-au-Prince, two territorial and social realities coexist almost in parallel. The metropolitan area is divided in two, between those living under the direct control of the gangs and the rest of the population. In qualitative terms, gangs continue to exert enormous pressure on the populations living under their control, a dynamic illustrated in particular by the explosion in rape and gender-based violence (GBV) figures, as well as population displacement.

In fact, gangs' control over populations and territories cannot be measured solely by homicide rates or attacks. Criminal groups can maintain order and, to a certain extent, calmness, within the territories they control, thereby reducing the number of deadly attacks, while the systemic effects of their domination persist or even expand. Therefore, while the decline in homicides is encouraging, there are several dynamics that need to be studied to better understand the situation.

First, the decline in homicides during Q2 is linked to the absence of inter-gang violence since the February 2024 relaunch of Viv Ansanm (Living Together, in Haitian Creole), a gang coalition that seeks to present a unified criminal front. Unlike previously, when gangs operated in continually conflicting capacities, Viv Ansanm has united multiple factions under a shared agenda. Since its revival, Viv Ansanm has fuelled gangs' capacity for mutual collaboration and institutionalization.²

Despite reported tensions and confrontations between certain groups, particularly in September, the end of the clashes has enabled gangs to shift their strategic focus, improve the management of their members and resources – particularly weapons and ammunition – and exert more extensive and coordinated control over larger areas. The revival of Viv Ansanm has led to a more unified approach

to criminal governance, replacing the fragmented and conflictual regulation enforced by individual gangs.

Secondly, the number of direct confrontations between gang members and Haiti's police has also decreased. Following the cat-and-mouse dynamic of confrontations, this can be seen as a tactical decision on behalf of the gangs. By reducing the number of direct attacks against law enforcement, gangs may lessen the immediate threat of retaliatory operations, which can destabilize their control over the territories they dominate. This allows them to focus on consolidating their power within these zones without drawing much attention from national and international actors.

Thirdly, Viv Ansanm's strengthened territorial control has allowed the gangs to expand their ability to extort and impose protection rackets, further embedding the gangs within Haiti's socio-economic and political structures. Moreover, the long-standing installation of checkpoints, as well as the imposition of rules that regulate people's movements, demonstrate the gangs' ability to assert their authority over daily life. This system is part of a larger territorialization effort, where violence is deployed to maintain order and build sovereignty.

Additionally, there has been a shift in the patterns of violence in several gang-controlled zones. While the underlying issues that perpetuate instability and suffering remain unresolved, truces have been brokered in the past months. On 25 July 2024, a ceasefire was reached between rival gangs in the neighbourhoods of Brooklyn, Belekou and Boston, in the Cité Soleil area in Port-au-Prince.³ The July 2024 truce marked a temporary cessation of hostilities and slightly improved living conditions for local residents.⁴

The agreement principally led to the destruction, by the gangs themselves, of roadblocks, walls (called VAR, in Haitian Creole) and checkpoints, and a public and private effort to collect garbage and sanitize neighbourhoods, allowing residents greater freedom of movement. The isolated neighbourhood of Brooklyn, in particular, has regained easier access to water supplies and food. Before the removal of the roadblocks, residents were unable to leave and were forced to rely

on people from surrounding neighbourhoods to bring in supplies, often at great personal risk.

However, the situation in Cité Soleil remains precarious. Previous truces, including one in July 2023,⁵ collapsed shortly after they were established. Despite the relative calm, the area faces serious challenges, including the presence of active gangs and harsh living conditions in the aftermath of widespread destruction – some areas still resemble urban war zones. In an interview in September 2024, a resident of Cité Soleil reported that the area has remained relatively calm since the July 2024 truce, although residents still lack humanitarian access and resources, such as safe drinking water and food, which can only be found outside the community. A coordinator of a Haitian non-governmental organization referred to the current state of affairs as ‘a negative peace’, indicating the reduction of direct violence while the underlying causes of the conflict and the absence of a reconciliation and justice process remain unresolved.⁶

In fact, violent clashes broke out on 12 September between the Simon Pelé and Boston groups. In the context of the end of a soccer tournament, and under conditions that are still unclear, armed men allegedly opened fire.⁷ The crossfire and executions reportedly

left dozens dead, with no final official toll having been made public. Interviews conducted with local residents also mention the tracking down of residents in the hours following the clashes, as well as displaced persons.

These acts of violence demonstrate the fragility of the situation and the gangs’ ability to reactivate violent practices from one moment to the next. The system of social control imposed by gangs is not arbitrary – it is part of a broader strategy of territorialization, where violence is used to enforce discipline and order. Violence is also used as a deterrent, creating an atmosphere of fear and unpredictability. Public displays of violence, such as massacres and the mutilation of bodies, are particularly effective in enforcing control, leading to mass displacements and migration. Kidnappings, extortion and public executions are often used to maintain order within their territories. These extreme acts of violence not only terrorize the local population, but also demonstrate the gang coalition’s power to rival factions and public authorities altogether, reinforcing its dominance.




FIGURE 1 Gang violence in Haiti, 2018–2024.

Source: José Luengo-Cabrera, with data from ACLED




FIGURE 2 Trends in food inflation in Haiti.

Source: José Luengo-Cabrera, with data from the World Bank




FIGURE 3 Haitian refugees and internally displaced people in Haiti, 2003-2023.

Source: José Luengo-Cabrera, with data from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

In this way, the Viv Ansanm coalition has effectively positioned itself as a criminal institution, and a mechanism for the regulation of violence. Viv Ansanm members have used violence not just as a tool of repression, but also as a means to establish and maintain a social order that benefits their interests. Through a combination of coercion, economic regulation and public displays of power, the coalition has created a controlled environment where it can more easily dictate the terms for inhabitants.

This increase in community-targeted violence has enormous social and humanitarian implications. Mass displacement occurs as people flee danger, which disrupts local economies and exacerbates poverty. The violence also weakens the community’s trust in the state and its law enforcement agents, as the perceived absence or ineffectiveness of the police contributes to a sense of abandonment and vulnerability.

Currently, over 578 000 people are displaced across Haiti, with a 60% increase between March and June 2024; of those, more than 112 000 are living in 96 informal sites scattered throughout the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.⁸ These sites, often located in schools,

churches and sports fields, suffer from shortages of water and sanitation facilities, such as latrines, creating perilous living conditions that heighten the risk of waterborne diseases.

More than 30 medical centres and hospitals have shut down owing to vandalism and looting.⁹ The largest hospital in the area, the State University of Haiti Hospital, was closed until efforts in June 2024 by the Haitian National Police helped resecure it, allowing it to reopen.¹⁰ Meanwhile, press reports say that only about 20% of hospitals in Port-au-Prince are operating normally.¹¹

Médecins Sans Frontières (or Doctors Without Borders), has highlighted the severe impact of gang violence on mental health and access to social services in gang-controlled areas. In these areas, often referred to as ‘red zones’, residents face significant barriers to accessing essential services as a result of the constant threat of violence, fear and stigma.¹² This environment exacerbates mental health issues, as individuals are frequently exposed to traumatic events and chronic stress. Additionally, the presence of rival gangs can make it nearly impossible for people to reach healthcare facilities, further isolating them from necessary medical and social support.




FIGURE 4 Internally displaced people in Haiti, by location and gender.

Source: José Luengo-Cabrera, with data from UNHCR

The past few months have also seen a marked increase in rapes and instances of GBV. According to a GI-TOC interview with a humanitarian officer, before the onset of violence in February 2024, international health facilities treated an estimated 10 rape cases per month. That number has increased to more than 40 victims per month since then, with many patients having previously been treated for GBV.¹³

These figures should be treated with caution. According to several humanitarian sources consulted in Port-au-Prince, victims under-report instances of sexual violence, as they often fear retaliation or lack trust in the justice system,¹⁴ which is weakened by attacks on justice personnel and a minimal police presence. Under-reporting also indicates a form of social violence that perpetuates control even after the initial attack, and affects mental and physical health. Access to treatment for GBV survivors is severely limited, exacerbating the physical and psychological trauma they experience.¹⁵

Victims of GBV may also choose not to report the crime to the authorities, but rather to local gang leaders whom they view as the authority in their neighbourhoods, invested with more power than the formal judicial process.¹⁶ The impact of GBV on the community is profound, as pervasive fear and trauma disrupt social cohesion, hinder economic activities and perpetuate a cycle of violence and instability.

Given these complex, intertwined dynamics of violence, the fall in reported homicides cannot be considered a sign of systemic progress in securing the capital. On the contrary, it accentuates the capacity of Haitian gangs to dominate and govern, and underscores the urgent need to deal with structural conditions, direct support, smuggling networks and the politico-criminal relations that support them.

Notes

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- 6 Interview conducted in Port-au-Prince, July 2024.
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- 8 Doctors Without Borders, People fleeing violence in Port-au-Prince urgently need water and sanitation, 15 August 2024.
- 9 Doctors Without Borders, Closed ports, empty shelves: Haiti urgently needs medical supplies, 21 May 2024.
- 10 Emmanuel Saintus, *L'Hôpital de l'Université d'État d'Haïti (HUEH) est toujours sous contrôle des agents de la Police Nationale d'Haïti*, Haiti Progres, 17 July 2024.
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- 15 Doctors Without Borders, People fleeing violence in Port-au-Prince urgently need water and sanitation, 15 August 2024.
- 16 Summer Walker, Gang control and security vacuums: Assessing gender-based violence in Cité Soleil, Haiti, GI-TOC, May 2023.

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