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Observatory of Illicit Economies in West Africa
Summary highlights
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Cattle rustling spikes in Mali amid increasing political isolation: Mopti region emerges as epicentre.
On 18 June 2022, suspected members of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara killed at least 20 civilians and seized cattle belonging to residents of Ebak village in Anchawadi commune, 35 kilometres north of Gao. Three months earlier, on 19 March, residents of Niougoun, a village in Segou region in central Mali, lost more than 200 heads of cattle to suspected jihadists. These incidents are merely two examples of many recent cattle-rustling incidents in central and northern Mali, an illicit activity that has continued to surge following a marked spike in 2021. Armed groups, including jihadists, are central players in the lucrative cattle-rustling economy, exerting significant control over the market in certain areas and exploiting existing community vulnerabilities. The 2021 uptick in cattle rustling has occurred in parallel with Mali’s growing political isolation and linked shifts in the country’s security tectonics. The restructuring of the political and security landscape in Mali has seemingly led to a greater impunity for both non-state actors and state or state-affiliated actors linked to the cattle-rustling economy.
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Banditry in northern Niger: geographic diffusion and multiplication of perpetrators.
A bandit attack on 8 April 2022 that left two Nigerien military officers dead illustrates two trends shaping armed banditry dynamics in northern Niger since late 2021. The first of these is the geographic diffusion of attacks, which have spread southwards from their original concentration in remote areas close to the Libyan border. The April attack occurred in a new hotspot – an area called Plaque 50, located just 300 kilometres north-east of Agadez. A second trend is the fragmentation of actors behind the attacks, with both Libyan and (particularly) Nigerien criminal groups becoming increasingly prominent. These operate differently from Chadian armed groups, who are long-standing perpetrators of banditry in the swathes of Nigerien desert hugging the Libyan border. This expansion in the constellation of armed groups preying on licit and illicit activities in northern Niger presents a marked deterioration in the regional security situation.
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The strategic logic of kidnappings in Mali and Burkina Faso.
The international focus on the issue of kidnapping as a business in the Sahel has dropped dramatically, in large part due to a reduction in the number of Western nationals falling victim to it. However, the phenomenon has far from disappeared. On the contrary, the kidnapping industry in central Mali and northern Burkina Faso surged in 2021 and this trend shows no signs of slowing in 2022, with most victims being locals caught in the battle between the numerous armed groups operating in the region. Analysis of the targets of kidnapping in central Mali and northern and eastern Burkina Faso, two of the regions most affected, suggests that although kidnapping for ransom is a primary source of revenue for armed groups, abductions operate primarily as a war instrument, wielded for purposes of intimidation, punishment and recruitment, with profit often featuring only as a secondary motivation.
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A surge in cybercrime in Oyo State, Nigeria, has triggered a spike in arrests and the involvement of anticrime group Amotekun, but alternative responses are needed.
In February 2022, a commander of Western Nigeria Security Network, codenamed ‘Operation Amotekun’, reported the group’s focus on cracking down on cybercriminals, known locally as ‘Yahoo Boys’. The commander labelled Yahoo Boys a ‘menace’ affecting the security of the south-western states. This came amid an upsurge in cybercrime in south-west Nigeria, despite escalating arrests. Law enforcement has scaled up responses in Oyo State, and particularly the state capital Ibadan, a cybercrime hub where Yahoo Boys are prominent. However, responses appear to be missing the mark. The inclusion of poorly regulated vigilante groups in responses to predominantly non-violent illicit markets risks escalating grievances and instability, which Nigeria can ill afford.
About this issue
The fourth issue of the Risk Bulletin of Illicit Economies in West Africa focuses primarily on the Sahel region, an area suffering from high levels of violence, conflict and instability. This issue leads with a story on the surge in cattle rustling since 2021; in Mopti region (central Mali), the number of cattle stolen rose threefold, from an average annual figure of approximately 42 000 to almost 130 000 in 2021. The 2021 uptick in cattle rustling has occurred in parallel with Mali’s growing political isolation and linked shifts in the country’s security tectonics.
Across the border in neighbouring Niger, recent attacks illustrate two key trends shaping armed banditry dynamics in northern Niger since late 2021, namely the geographic diffusion of bandit attacks and the fragmentation of the actors responsible for them. This expansion in the constellation of armed groups preying on licit and illicit activities in northern Niger presents a marked deterioration in the regional security situation.
Across areas of the Sahel and in Nigeria, kidnap for ransom operates as a prominent illicit economy that multiplies harms to communities, and in some contexts provides significant revenues to armed groups. The third story of this issue examines how the dynamics surrounding the kidnapping industry in Mali and Burkina Faso have changed over the past five years, culminating in a surge of incidents in 2021 and 2022 that target first and foremost local populations. While previously kidnap for ransom has predominantly been assessed through the lens of revenue flows to armed actors, this article explores how it is used as a tool in armed-group governance.
The final article explores the involvement of self-defence group Amotekun in responding to a surge in cybercrime in Nigeria’s Oyo State, in a clear case of mission creep. Development responses are needed to complement already scaled up law enforcement responses – the inclusion of poorly regulated vigilante groups in responses to predominantly non-violent illicit markets risks escalating grievances and instability, rendering responses counterproductive.