As a non-state armed group tightens its grip over resources in western CAR, violence looks likely to escalate.

Following the death of the former leader of the 3R rebel group, Bi Sidi Souleymane, in March 2021, a certain ‘General Bobbo’, reportedly the brother of the head of the Chadian domestic secret service,¹ assumed leadership over a new iteration of the CAR armed group. The group, which has its roots in the ethnic conflict that ensued after the 2013 coup in CAR,² was formed in 2015 to protect Muslim Fulani pastoralists from Anti-balaka reprisal attacks. Under the leadership of General Bobbo, experts believe the group has now become more intent on various forms of illicit income generation, enforced by violent means, than pursuing ideological goals.³

Still at the heart of 3R’s criminal-economic enterprise is the lucrative livestock trade, which revolves around controlling large stretches of territory used for transhumance and taxing the cattle sector. However, more recently the group has begun to exploit the country’s gold resources mainly through taxation systems. As a result, diversifying revenue streams.⁴

Since July 2020, 3R is also alleged to have started using improvised explosive devices (IEDs).⁵ Numerous violent incidents have been recorded since early 2021 (see Figure 4), wreaking havoc among the group’s adversaries, including Russian mercenaries, and harassing the civilian population,⁶ who continue to find themselves as victims in a complex context where state forces, foreign mercenaries, and criminal rebel networks vie for control over CAR’s resources.

3R is militarily active across large swathes of the border with neighbouring Cameroon,⁷ territory it defends fiercely, carrying out attacks on the Central African Armed Forces (known by their French acronym, FACA) and the army’s Russian allies. Russia began expanding its influence in 2017 after receiving requests for aid from FACA and a private Russian military company, the Wagner Group, that reportedly has ties to the Russian government, is currently operating in the CAR.⁸ The Russian government denies being linked to the Wagner Group.⁹

Hausa Fulani pastoralists at a cattle market.

© Luis Tato/AFP via Getty Images

Figure 3 Violent incidents since January 2021, gold mining sites and transhumance corridors, western CAR.

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The evolution of a violent group

The livestock economy, the core business of Fulani pastoralists, has long been one of 3R’s key sources of revenue. Transhumance corridors used by herders are numerous in the Central African Republic, and armed groups are engaged in a turf war to control taxation of this lucrative trade. Before the 2013 crisis in CAR, the livestock sector accounted for 15% of the country’s economy.¹⁰ Today, however, it plays a major role in the illicit financing of armed groups, including 3R, either through taxation or ownership of and trade in cattle.¹¹

The group levies a percentage at each stage of the value chain: taxes are levied on pastoralists from Cameroon and Chad, as well as CAR nationals, to allow their herds seasonal pasture in the group’s territory for three months; taxes are also imposed on livestock sales, transport, trucks and market stalls, and other arbitrary items.¹²

In its December 2018 report, the group of experts of the United Nations sanctions committee in CAR said that ‘[…] the influence of armed groups on the livestock economy is such that legal and illegal activities are now completely intertwined. All actors in the supply chain, whether herders, traders, transporters or government agents, have no choice but to cooperate with and contribute to the financing of armed groups – at least indirectly.’¹³

Although the CAR has long been known for its diamond deposits, the gold sector has significantly grown in importance in recent years, especially in the west of the country where a large number of goldfields are located. This is territory where 3R is active, and the gold mining sector has become another major source of revenue for the group.¹⁴

Gold extracted by artisanal mining in western CAR is predominantly smuggled over the border to Cameroon, largely via the border town of Garoua Bulaï. From there, gold is typically smuggled to Yaoundé or Douala for export, mainly destined for Dubai. There are also reports of gold being smuggled to a lesser extent overland to Nigeria and the wider subregion.¹⁵

According to UN experts, 3R does not have the same level of expertise in the mineral resource markets as other non-state armed groups, such as the Union for Peace in CAR (UPC).¹⁶ Thus, their activity is reportedly limited to collecting payments from miners and for the provision of security at mine sites, rather than engaging directly in gold mining or trading.¹⁷ However, reports that Nigerian networks were buying gold from the late 3R leader in Bossangoa, a north-western town near territory held by 3R, could suggest that 3R are beginning to play a role as intermediaries in the gold supply chain. ¹⁸

The presence of 3R in the western prefectures of Ouham-Pendé and Nana-Manbéré, and recent expansion into Manbéré-Kadéï has a negative impact on the ability of local communities to generate a livelihood from the gold sector, which they depend on. Insecurity and taxation limit local communities’ ability to access mine sites and move around in the area, and have the effect of reducing mine workers’ income. Reportedly, miners have fled from several mine sites since January 2021.¹⁹ This disruption to local populations has been significantly heightened since the start of 2021 by the group’s increasing deployment of IEDs, which have killed both armed combatants and civilians. According to one BBC report, around a thousand people were forcibly displaced from their village in the Nana-Mambéré region, which borders Cameroon, after a device exploded there in May 2021.²⁰

Figure 4 Incidents of violence in CAR, July 2020–October 2021.

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There are strong indications that Russian actors may also be making a play for the CAR minerals sector.²¹ Russia has made clear moves to become more involved in and grow the country’s diamond trade,²² while concerns abound over Russian interests influencing proposed mineral legislation,²³ and over the granting of controversial mining rights to Russian companies.²⁴ The presence of Russian actors in the country raises further questions about their interests in the country’s mineral resources, including gold. It also has the potential of directly influencing interactions between 3R and state forces and their Russian allies as groups compete for control of gold resources in western CAR.

A well-oiled machine

Armed 3R fighters stand guard for their leader.

© Reuters

3R has a more defined command structure than other rebel groups in the country. According to international experts that have been monitoring 3R, the group’s command has been careful not to let leaders stay too long in the same position in order to prevent individuals from becoming powerful ‘barons’. Furthermore, according to international observers, some of the weapons used by 3R are numbered and registered, which indicates higher levels of organization than normally seen among armed groups in the region.²⁵

3R’s access to substantial revenue sources from their criminal activities is reflected in the group’s equipment: their pickup vehicles are in good condition and its fighting force well armed, with an arsenal that includes Kalashnikovs, rocket launchers, grenades and heavy machine guns – this according to security actors working in the country.²⁶ Other armed groups are said to be envious of their clothing and the treatment that 3R gives its fighters.²⁷

Changes in leadership and regional allies

Now at the helm of 3R is General Sembé Bobbo, who recently succeeded Bi Sidi Souleymane. Souleymane had been placed under sanctions by the US Treasury Department and the UN Sanctions Committee in 2020, having been accused of leading an armed group that had ‘killed, tortured, raped and displaced thousands of people since 2015’.²⁸ Souleymane died in March 2021 from a combat injury he sustained in November 2020.²⁹ According to security experts in international organizations, internal struggles for the takeover eventually led to Bobbo succeeding him.³⁰

Bobbo is reported to be the brother of a former Chadian Fulani warlord, Baba Laddé,³¹ whose crimes in CAR at the head of a Chadian Fulani rebel group earned him an eight-year prison sentence in Chad. In October 2021, Baba Laddé was appointed director of Chadian domestic intelligence by Mahamat Déby, son of the late president (and currently de facto president of Chad, as chairman of the Transitional Military Council).³²

It is not clear how close the brothers are or if their relationship will impact on the strategy or actions of 3R going forward. The change in leadership, however, may strengthen informal ties to CAR’s neighbours, particularly Chad, strengthening the group’s existing regional connections.

Alliances with actors in Cameroon and Chad also play a key role in the group’s funding strategies.³³ Various high-ranking members of the Chadian military, who own and invest in livestock, are said to have commercial ties to elements within 3R. The group also reportedly sources some of its weapons in Chad from officers in N’Djamena.³⁴ Meanwhile, according to UN experts, Chad, tolerates 3R as long as the group does not harbour Chadian dissidents.

Prospects for the future

Competition over rents between armed groups has led to violence as they battle for control of territory, diamonds and gold in CAR.³⁵ The CAR military and their Russian allies have managed to repulse armed non-state actors from most of the country’s main towns, but the rebel groups continue to conduct guerrilla warfare from the bush and from Chad. Meanwhile, incidents of violence and conflict continue to occur across the country. The upcoming dry season, which runs broadly from December to April and is more favourable to offensives by armed groups, may see 3R gain ground.

To date, peace negotiations between the Coalition of Patriots for Change, an umbrella group of non-state armed actors that includes 3R, and the government in Bangui have made little progress, and violence is expected to continue. In north-west and western CAR, it is foreseeable that efforts by criminal groups to generate income streams by taxing informal economies and predation will continue to drive insecurity. With 3R under a new leader, who is reportedly more profit-motivated than ideologically driven,³⁶ and the presence of Russian forces in the area, possibly eyeing its resource wealth, conflict is likely to continue and worsen as the various rent-seeking actors seek to control and profit from territory and minerals. The increasing use of IEDs by 3R only exacerbates these risks. As such, moving forward, illicit revenues from the cattle and gold sectors will need to be a component of peace talks if there is to be any hope for progress.

Notes