Canary Islands migrant smugglers ramp up to meet surging demand.

In the first quarter of 2025, the maritime smuggling route from West and North Africa to the Canary Islands remained the most active — and deadliest — way for migrants to enter the European Union.¹ After trending dramatically upwards since 2020, the number of migrants using the Canary Islands route (also known as the Atlantic route or north-west African route) escalated sharply in 2023 (40 330) and 2024 (46 843) to roughly double the annual arrival figures in 2020 and 2021.²

Displacement of Malians and other West Africans away from northbound trans-Sahelian routes explains part of this increase. Reflecting this, between 2023 and 2024 the Central Mediterranean route saw a 59% reduction in migrant numbers.³ Resurgence of conflict in northern Mali, tightening migration policy in Tunisia and human rights abuses in Libya have encouraged thousands of migrants — many advised by their smugglers — to head for the coasts of Mauritania and Senegal and hire smugglers to reach the Canary Islands by boat. Passeurs (a word used widely in West Africa to refer to a variety of intermediaries in the smuggling chain) in Mali have been quick to advertise this alternative routing.

While economic drivers once underpinned most movement on the Atlantic route, it is increasingly tied to regional conflict dynamics. Moroccan and Senegalese migrants once significantly outstripped other nationalities, but in 2024 and 2025 the largest group of migrants on the route (about 40%) were Malians.⁴ A growing number of them are from conflict-affected regions, with the Atlantic route also well positioned to underpin likely secondary movement of displaced Malians from refugee camps in Mauritania.

Figure 1 Numbers of arrivals in the Canary Islands by nationality, 2019–2024.

Source: Frontex, Migratory map

Smuggling networks in Senegal and Mauritania have become increasingly organized to meet sustained — and escalating — demand. With intermediaries across neighbouring coastal states and in Mali, networks have increased the efficiency of departure logistics and cater to an increasingly wide range of clients — well evidenced indicators of growing professionalization and human smuggling as a vector in migration.⁵

With the conflict landscape showing no sign of improvement, movement on the Canary Islands route looks set to increase further. Because it remains the deadliest migration route in the world, this has severe humanitarian implications.⁶

Factors behind the shift towards the Canary Islands route

Political and security developments in North Africa and northern Mali have reshaped smuggling routes since late 2023.⁷ In September, after negotiations with the European Union, a toughening of Tunisia’s migration policy led to mass expulsions and an 80% decrease in the number of migrants and refugees transiting the country.⁸ In Libya, reports of abuse, kidnappings for ransom and sales of detainees to traffickers have spread southwards, increasing awareness of the risks of transit.⁹

In addition, two security upheavals in northern Mali have altered the security equilibrium that allowed migrants and refugees to travel through key hubs such as Timbuktu. First, the outbreak of hostilities between the Cadre stratégique permanent (the Strategic Framework for the Defence of the People of Azawad, now disbanded) and the Forces Armées Maliennes (Malian Armed Forces — FAMa), operating with the support of Russia’s Wagner Group (now rebranded Africa Corps) since mid-2023. Second, violent extremist groups — including the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province have stepped up their activities, notably by imposing blockades on large northern towns, and on the city of Timbuktu between August and December 2023.¹⁰

In the last quarter of 2023, passeurs started rerouting clients away from routes bisecting northern Mali towards Algeria and onto routes bisecting Kayes region in south-western Mali towards Senegal and Mauritania.¹¹ While the scale of the rerouting is difficult to assess, monitoring of key smuggling nodes provides insights. Individuals working with migrants and refugees in Timbuktu, a key node on northbound routes, estimate that flows between 2023 and 2024 decreased by more than 30%. In contrast, flows through Gogui — a key smuggling node in Kayes region, bordering Mauritania — were estimated to have increased by roughly the same proportion. This was largely attributed to growing movements of migrants and refugees from neighbouring states and a smaller increase in Malian nationals.¹² Smugglers in Kayes also reported that their business boomed in 2024: one smuggler interviewed in February 2025 said he helps more than 40 migrants and refugees daily, compared with 15 in 2022.¹³

This rerouting is organized and communicated to migrants and refugees by passeurs, shaping journeys by Malians and nationals of other neighbouring states in distinct ways.

For most West African migrants and refugees — largely Guineans, Ivorians, Gambians and Burkinabè — seeking to travel north through Mali, Bamako is often the place where they connect with a smuggler to continue their journey. In the capital, many are told that travelling north has become too dangerous. Key threats identified by passeurs include FAMa and Wagner (now Africa Corps) patrols, and the risk of drones and air strikes on smuggling convoys. Instead, passeurs recommend travelling west, connecting migrants and refugees with Kayes region passeurs who organize their trip towards Senegal or Mauritania.¹⁴ Recruiters working for Senegalese and Mauritanian networks plying the Atlantic route also have intermediaries in neighbouring coastal states, enabling some West African migrants and refugees to travel towards disembarkation points on routes that avoid Mali entirely.

Most Malian nationals travelling on the Canary Islands route continue to be from Kayes and Sikasso regions, which have longstanding traditions of migration on this route.¹⁵ Deteriorating economic and security conditions¹⁶ have contributed to the growing displacement since late 2023.¹⁷ Notably, most Malians interviewed on the route gave economic reasons as the primary driver for movement. However, this is usually the case, with security concerns typically cited only later.

JNIM is increasingly operating in western and southern Mali, doubling its attacks between 2022 and 2023 then stabilizing at that level in 2024.¹⁸ There is also escalating displacement from conflict across central and northern Mali, where civilian casualties — particularly at the hands of FAMa and Wagner — totalled almost 1 500 between January 2024 and March 2025 (compared with 350 at the hands of JNIM).¹⁹ Most flee towards refugee camps at the Mauritanian border, where more than 260 000 Malians had arrived as of September 2024.²⁰ For now, most remain in the camps; many are in poor physical condition, lack resources to continue their journeys, and require permits to move between regions of Mauritania.

However, international organizations working on migration in Senegal and Mauritania report that a growing number of Malian refugees displaced by conflict are moving on the Canary Islands route.²¹ Some estimates suggest that 10–15% of asylum seekers in refugee camps in Mauritania reach the coast and embark on maritime journeys towards the Canary Islands.²² There are concerns that the influx of displaced Malians in Mauritania could drive a further increase in movements on the Canary Islands route and that pressure from migratory inflows could intensify economic stresses in Mauritania, triggering growing secondary movements on the route.²³

Contributing to this escalating emigration from southern Mali, some residents of northern and central Mali, who would typically have emigrated northwards on traditional smuggling routes from Timbuktu or Gao towards Algeria, are also increasingly deciding to use the western route through Kayes region.

Figure 2 Conflict incidents in the Sahel and changes in migratory routes, 2019–2024.

Source: Data from the GI-TOC and ACLED

The professionalization of the migrant smuggling industry in Senegal and Mauritania

There are signs of smuggling networks becoming increasingly professional and efficient at pivotal disembarkation nodes to cater to increased demand on the Canary Islands route. Although disembarkation points are dispersed across several countries, most migrants displaced from trans-Sahelian routes head for Mauritania and to a lesser extent Senegal, and dynamics at these nodes demonstrate clear signs of professionalization.

For example, the journey through embarkation points has become much quicker. This was particularly highlighted for M’Bour, a key departure point about 70 kilometres south of Dakar. Migrants and refugees often arrive and depart on the same day, while previously they often spent days or weeks in the city before setting sail.²⁴

The logistics of departure are well coordinated. At the scheduled time, small fishing boats arrive at the beach, each transporting 10–15 individuals at a time to a larger boat at sea. This is in contrast to the early 2020s, when most migrants and refugees embarked on the larger boats directly.²⁵ Captains of these smaller vessels are well remunerated, reportedly earning FCFA300 000–FCFA500 000 (about €460–€760) at the end of each operation. The amount probably reflects the significant risk of interception. Each migrant or refugee must show a boarding pass to get on the fishing boat. This system was implemented in 2023 when the growing number of clients necessitated better systems to avoid non-payment. Other members of the smuggling network track police movements on land and coastguard positions at sea, relaying updates to the captain of the large pirogue waiting offshore.

Second, the profile of migrants and refugees departing from Senegal and Mauritania has changed, becoming more diverse and increasingly distinct from the ethno-linguistic profile of their smugglers. This growing contrast between the profiles of migrants and their smugglers often points towards growing organization of the smuggling industry.²⁶

Stakeholders in M’Bour estimated that in 2023 and 2024, more than 80% of individuals embarking on the Canary Islands route were not Senegalese, with more than half of these Malians.²⁷ Previously, most of those travelling were Senegalese.²⁸ Within Mali, most recruiters are still Malians who connect clients travelling towards M’Bour with passeurs in the city, typically Senegalese nationals, often of the Lebou ethnic group.²⁹

From 2024, a growing number of Asian nationals, most prominently from Pakistan, have also embarked on the Canary Islands route from Mauritania (and to a lesser degree Senegal). Growing restrictions on other favoured routes — including the Balkan route, from which migrants and refugees are rerouted to fly via the UAE to Senegal — have contributed to this trend.³⁰ Similarly, increasing restrictions on routings from Senegal and Mauritania — via Spain and Turkey to Nicaragua, and onwards overland to the United States — have also contributed to growing travel on the Canary Islands route, as many Asian nationals found themselves in Mauritania and Senegal unable to follow their original journey plan.³¹

Prices and payment modalities offer further insights into the smuggling ecosystem. Prices for Senegalese nationals embarking from M’Bour have remained relatively steady: €350–€760 in February 2025 compared with €450–€760 in 2022.³² Similarly, prices for West Africans (non-Senegalese nationals), though much higher (€900–€1 000) have remained generally stable since 2022.³³ In Nouakchott, Mauritania, prices were €1 200–€1 800 in March 2025,³⁴ compared with €1 300–€1 525 in 2022.³⁵ The relative stability of prices suggests that smuggling networks have been able to respond to higher demand by increasing supply.

A volatile outlook

Monitoring dynamics on the Canary Islands route will be key as JNIM continues to expand operations into southern Mali and secondary movements from Mauritania increase. Growing economic stresses in Sahelian and coastal states — including a forecast economic downturn in Senegal³⁶ — are likely to add to the drivers of movement on this route. Monitoring should include analysis of smuggling network professionalization — a vector for movement and a key factor in shaping risks for those on the move.

Responses by West African states will also affect the smuggling ecosystem. In the short term, measures taken by Mauritania in March 2025 — including expelling migrants and refugees into Mali and Senegal at an unprecedented scale and dismantling a number of networks³⁷ — may temporarily displace routings via Senegal, which could experience a resulting upsurge in departures during summer. This has implications for the safety and security of those on the move, forced to embark upon a longer — and therefore more dangerous — maritime journey from embarkation points in Senegal.

Notes