Conflict, coups and containers: why the Sahel cocaine routes were disrupted.

Situated at the crossroads of routes linking West and North Africa, the countries of the Sahel have long been bisected by cocaine and cannabis resin trafficking routes, mainly to Europe.¹ Both drug markets are deeply entrenched in the region’s political and security dynamics, meaning they shape — and are shaped by — regional conflict and instability.² While cannabis resin is more prominent in terms of volume, this bulletin focuses on cocaine.

Between 2019 and 2023, available evidence indicates that northbound trans-Sahelian cocaine trafficking underwent a resurgence. Consumption of cocaine powder and crack increased in parts of the Sahel,³ many stakeholders close to the trade reported growing flows,⁴ and wider regional developments (discussed below) created enabling conditions for resurgence.

In addition, although an unreliable indicator of trafficking volumes, cocaine seizures, concentrated in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, soared from an average of 13 kilograms a year between 2015 and 2020 to 1 466 kilograms in 2022.⁵ This suggestion of a sustained growth in trans-Sahelian trafficking raised security concerns, given the well-documented links with between the cocaine trade and some non-state armed groups — notably elements of the Cadre stratégique permanent (CSP, the Strategic Framework for the Defence of the People of Azawad, now disbanded) — operating in the region.⁶

However, dramatic changes in the Sahelian conflict and political landscape since 2023, and in Libya in February 2025, appear to have disrupted cocaine trafficking through northern Niger and to a lesser extent northern Mali. Meanwhile, reports of significant trafficking in southern Mali, often seen as an indicator of northbound flows,⁷ are probably linked to coastal trafficking routes.

Conflict and coups drive traffickers to change direction

Two developments in 2023 were key in reshaping northbound cocaine trafficking flows towards Europe. First, the July coup in Niger, which disrupted long-standing links between trafficking networks and state-embedded actors and sponsors. And second, the August outbreak of conflict in northern Mali between rebel armed groups and the extremist group Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) on the one hand, and the Malian armed forces supported by Russia’s Wagner Group on the other.

Figure 1 Cocaine trafficking routes before and after the 2023 resurgence of conflict in northern Mali and the military coup in Niger.

Source: Data from the GI-TOC and ACLED

By the end of 2023, northern Mali was experiencing levels of violence not seen in the area since 2013,⁹ and many trafficking routes shifted to avoid areas affected by armed conflict and changes in territorial control. In some cases, this entailed an adjustment within the broader trafficking corridor; for example, Tabankort had been a main logistical and storage hub for cocaine and cannabis resin transiting northern Mali, but these activities reportedly shifted to In-Afarak, which remains under the control of the Azawad Liberation Front, a coalition of separatist armed groups formed in December 2024.¹⁰ In other cases, routes were displaced further, towards overland routes via southern Algeria, southern Mali, Mauritania or coastal countries, or onto air and maritime routes.¹¹

Displacement has been particularly sustained away from the east of Mali’s Kidal region — where the CSP lost control of key trafficking nodes and the ability to protect drug convoys. The sharp spike in armed violence raised the risk of attacks on convoys, decreasing Niger-bound flows and resulting in a significant loss of business for several intermediaries operating there.¹²

Niger’s July 2023 coup also disrupted a long-standing protection system that enabled many traffickers to operate with a high degree of impunity,¹³ and the net result was a sharp drop in trafficking of cocaine and cannabis resin through northern Niger. A trafficker involved in transporting drugs through the Mauritanian desert and northern Mali reported that networks in Niger have been unable to recover due to a lack of trust in the new authorities.¹⁴ Several high-level traffickers with close ties to the former regime have adopted a lower profile and scaled down operations.¹⁵

Although the protection infrastructure is likely to be reconstituted over time, the disruption to the trade has been significant and some high-level players linked to the previous regime have turned to alternative income streams. For example, immediately after the coup, the trafficking activities of Ghoumour Itouwa Bidika, long alleged to be a player in the transport of cocaine and cannabis resin through northern Niger,¹⁶ reportedly diminished. More recently, sources close to Bidika claimed that he had transitioned to the informal gold market in southern Algeria.¹⁷ This is in contrast to Mali’s cocaine and cannabis resin markets, where major players have, according to available evidence, largely remained stable.¹⁸

Increased state patrols along key trafficking corridors¹⁹ and escalating instability fomented by Nigerien and Chadian bandit groups, which have frequently attacked and seized drug convoys, have also contributed to lower flows through northern Niger since 2023.²⁰ Overall, from mid-2023, traffickers in Niger reported a sustained decrease in drug convoys, particularly those connecting northern Mali to the Salvador Pass, a key drug-trafficking node on the Niger-Libya border en route to European consumption markets.²¹

On the other side of the pass, in Qatrun in southern Libya, clashes erupted in February 2025 between the LAAF and Chadian mercenaries linked to the disbanded 128 Brigade of the LAAF.²² These mercenaries were reportedly connected to a trafficker and had allegedly been involved in protecting northbound drug shipments.²³

At the time of writing, the fighting had driven the mercenaries and the trafficker out of Qatrun and into northern Niger. It had also halted most trafficking in southern Libya, instability and lack of clarity about further LAAF actions in the region rendering operations too risky. Coupled with events in northern Niger, this development underscores the volatility and growing risk for traffickers operating in nominally ‘stable’ parts of the Sahel and North Africa.

Shifting dynamics in southern Mali

Since late 2022, cocaine flows through southern Mali and Senegal have reportedly been increasing.²⁴ However, this should not be interpreted as evidence of increased northbound trans-Sahelian flows.²⁵ Part of the increase is probably attributable to displacement from northern Mali since 2023, as outlined above, onto routes through the western Kayes region towards Mauritania or Senegal.²⁶ Perhaps more importantly, flows transiting southern Mali are often linked to transit between coastal entry and exit points, rather than northbound consignments.²⁷

The prevailing direction of trafficking across the Senegal-Mali border has reportedly reversed since late 2022 and is now predominantly into Senegal, towards coastal export points and ultimately headed for Europe.²⁸ Alongside the growing difficulties facing northbound routes, traffickers’ growing use of West Africa to containerize cocaine may also have played a role in this reversal.

Since 2019, a growing volume of cocaine consignments arriving in West Africa have been trafficked from Brazil, Suriname or Guyana on pleasure craft, fishing vessels and bulk cargo ships, rather than in containers. In the Gulf of Guinea, these vessels offload (directly or through sea drop-offs) onto vessels from West Africa, where the cocaine is landed, stored, repackaged and redistributed before being exported, largely towards Europe. Although intelligence gaps remain regarding the West Africa to Europe leg of the journey, a significant proportion of Europe-bound consignments are believed to be containerized.

Stakeholders in Senegal report that cocaine trafficked through the south-east, including from Mali, is often disembarked in Sierra Leone or Guinea on its way to Dakar.²⁹ The Senegalese port has higher throughput and better links to Europe than ports in neighbouring states, offering better opportunities for concealment in licit cargo. Although there have been no material seizures of cocaine consignments in Dakar port in recent years, scanning and screening capacities are concentrated on imports, as is the case with maritime ports globally, meaning that outbound flows are less likely to be seized.

Routes through Mali are longer than other options linking points of entry (Sierra Leone and Guinea) and exit (Dakar), notably further west around Kalifourou in Senegal, also a prominent trafficking route. So why bring cocaine into Mali at all? Traffickers’ efforts to diversify routes, challenging disruption, is probably part of the answer. But this longer journey also reflects the long-standing importance of Bamako as a base for several key traffickers.

Analysis of drug markets elsewhere suggests that consignments are often moved from points of entry to areas close to the home base of senior players, where they are stored until conditions are right for their redistribution — because a purchaser has been confirmed, or logistics have been put in place — even where this entails longer routings.³⁰ Some reports also indicate that although many actors in Mali’s cocaine trade remain unchanged, some networks previously operating in the north have increasingly favoured routes through the south and neighbouring states, mostly Senegal, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania, and by sea.³¹ This could have further strengthened the importance of Bamako as a logistics hub in subregional cocaine routings.

Conclusion

Trafficking networks across the Sahel have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to adapt to shifting security and conflict dynamics, changing routes and allegiances to protect trafficking volumes.³² Some elements of recent disruption are likely to prove only temporary — in Niger, for example, the effects of the 2023 coup will probably fade over time, as networks adapt to the new political landscape and forge new relationships in order to revive their operations. However, the volatile conflict dynamics between state actors and their auxiliaries, coupled with the growing constellation of non-state armed groups (insurgents, violent extremists and criminals) in the northern areas of Mali and Niger, means that many regions will remain under the patchwork control of a number of different actors. Traffickers looking to bisect these regions will continue to face a high risk of losing their cargo to attacks, as no single actor can guarantee protection. This is likely to continue to suppress trans-Sahelian cocaine trafficking in the medium-term, with maritime routes, or overland routes crossing the coastal states, providing a more reliable option.

Notes