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Observatory of Illicit Economies in West Africa
Summary highlights
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IS Sahel: Consolidating territory and reviving economies.
Since 2023, the Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) has expanded and consolidated its influence over north-eastern Mali’s Ménaka region. After eliminating non-state armed groups that represented competition, the group has shifted from mass violence against civilians to building community support, largely by facilitating licit and illicit economic activity. IS Sahel might well apply this behavioural shift, even if accompanied by targeted violence against elements perceived to threaten its local dominance. If sustained, this nascent ‘hearts and minds’ strategy could bolster the group’s local resilience and durability.
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Bandits shift kidnapping focus in Nigeria’s north from rural areas to cities.
Long a scourge of rural and remote areas, kidnapping by bandits in North West and North Central Nigeria is increasingly shifting into urban areas, as shown by a spate of incidents since May 2024. Urban and peri-urban areas offer bandits more opportunities for financial gain, as they present a larger pool of targets, alongside potential inroads into other illicit activities. The spike in urban kidnappings may in part be due to military operations displacing bandit activities in rural areas. An effective counter-banditry strategy must include tracking the spread of banditry and forestalling the risk of further geographic displacement.
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Political extortion? JNIM’s blockade of Boni, Mali.
Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)’s blockade of the town of Boni in central Mali has intensified since June 2024, severely disrupting the local economy and civilian mobility. Under increased military pressure, JNIM has engaged in extortion, robbery and arson against drivers and vehicles attempting to bypass the blockade. This is a departure from its usual focus on attempting to build popular consent. Two key factors are driving this. One is JNIM’s typical use of extreme but targeted measures to achieve particular ends – in this case a severance of relations between the population of Boni and state forces. The other is the nature of JNIM’s behaviour on roads. Transiting populations are perpetually seen as a source of danger by JNIM, and they will remain at a higher risk of violence and crime than static populations, at least until the group has absolute confidence in its control.
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Benin–Niger border closure drives surge in migrant smuggling profits.
Following a military coup d’état in Niger in July 2023, member states of the West African economic bloc ECOWAS shut their borders with the country. This terminated regular regional migratory flows from Benin across the Niger River into Niger, and triggered a compensatory surge in human smuggling. Alongside strengthening smuggling networks, the border closure hit traders’ livelihoods, boding ominously for security, especially since violent extremist organizations had already established a foothold in the local criminal economy. While there is no evidence at this stage that extremist recruitment has increased, the longer the border stays closed, the more this becomes a risk.
About this issue
The 11th issue of the Risk Bulletin of Illicit Economies in West Africa aims to highlight the impacts of collisions between illicit actors, states, and the communities that illicit networks rely on.
One of these illicit actors, Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel), has dramatically reversed its fortunes since late 2021. From being almost eradicated as an armed group in 2021, IS Sahel now has almost complete control of the Ménaka region of north-eastern Mali, which it staked through extreme brutality. While this may have purged the area of would-be resistors, it has also meant the drying up of local economies, in turn challenging the group’s ability to raise the money for its operations and obtain vital supplies. IS Sahel has since changed tack and is now aiming for a more benevolent relationship with civilians, an approach that appears to be serving them well, and could lead to growth in their power as a group.
In Nigeria, evidence is showcased of a changing geography for banditry. A spate of kidnappings in urban areas, apparently committed by the same bandit groups that have destabilized large swathes of north-western Nigeria, is alarming residents and security observers. Several factors may be driving this, particularly military operations against the bandits’ rural territory. However, it may also be a consequence of the bandits having over-exploited their home areas, with many families now unable to pay ransoms having already paid them several times before.
In central Mali, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) has escalated its blockade of the town of Boni in the Mopti region, a response to the deployment of Malian armed forces and Russian troops to a nearby base. Fearing that Boni residents will collaborate with the armed forces and damage their hold on the area, JNIM has resorted to some extreme behaviour – including pillaging and robbing people attempting to enter Boni. The article also examines why road passengers entering Boni, but also for road users more broadly across the Sahel, appear consistently vulnerable to JNIM’s predation.
The closure of Niger’s border with Benin following the July 2023 coup disrupted regular migratory routes and led to a sharp rise in human smuggling across the Niger River. As legal crossings were blocked, demand for smuggling services increased, boosting profits for smugglers and straining local livelihoods. Although Benin reopened its side of the border in February 2024, Niger did not reciprocate, causing continued instability and the resilience of the illicit trade. Reopening the Nigerien side of the border could be key to restoring security and economic stability.
These stories illustrate how research by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime consistently seeks to offer context when examining organized criminal economies, blending detailed insights into the functioning of illicit markets at the local level with the external factors influencing them.