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Observatory of Illicit Economies in West Africa

Issue

6

January

2023

Summary highlights

1. Key trends in illicit economies and conflict in 2022.

   Across West Africa, illicit economies are known to have a close relationship with conflict and instability dynamics. But which illicit economies are most important to consider when analyzing the impact of organized crime on conflict and instability? And what were the key trends in 2022? This article examines the development of three illicit economies that play a key role in instability dynamics, both armed and political, across the region. First, the geographic diffusion of kidnap for ransom is analyzed. Second, turning to the political landscape, we explore how the cocaine trade, which appears to be growing across the region, intersected with politics in 2022 and appears poised to continue this trajectory in 2023. Finally, we turn our attention to the illicit gold trade, focusing particularly on state responses to this illicit economy.

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2. With key shifts in dynamics entrenched in 2022, cattle rustling is set to remain a major threat in Nigeria and Mali in 2023.

   In recent years, cattle rustling dynamics in Nigeria and Mali have undergone key shifts. While, in Nigeria, northern states remain the most affected by cattle rustling, an illicit economy that has long been a major source of financing for violent extremist organizations, armed bandits and ethnic militias, several states in the south of the country have experienced a growth in the number of cattle rustling incidents since 2018. Moreover, several risk factors associated with past cattle rustling surges in the north – namely, intensifying competition and tensions between herders and farming communities – are increasingly present in the south-west. Meanwhile, in central and northern Mali, cattle rustling has increased since the beginning of 2022, and there are clear indicators that it will remain a central element in the financing and governance strategies of armed groups throughout 2023.

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3. JNIM consolidated its presence in the central Sahel in 2022, but 2023 will test its credibility as an alternative governance provider.

   Having consolidated its presence in most of the central Sahel, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) has now firmly established itself as the dominant non-state armed actor in the regional conflict. Throughout 2022, JNIM continued to successfully exploit illicit economies as a means of garnering support from local communities. But despite notable advances into the northern areas of West Africa’s littoral states, the group has not yet managed to replace the state as primary governance provider, which has increased its reliance on violence against civilians as a means of controlling the population. If JNIM is able to push state actors out of areas of Benin in 2023, it will be able to offer more tangible benefits to local residents, thus having a greater chance of establishing itself as a credible governance provider.

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4. Russia’s military, mercenary and criminal interests in West Africa grew in 2022 and look set to expand in 2023.

   The knock-on effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have reshaped its engagement in West Africa: Western sanctions have had a disruptive impact on Russian businesses on the continent, while, at the same time, engaging in Africa has become more strategically important for Russia in its newly politically and economically isolated state. The mercenary organization Wagner Group has rapidly become the most influential form of Russian engagement in Africa. In late January 2023, the US government announced they would be designating the Wagner Group as a ‘transnational criminal organization’. As investigations into Wagner’s activities show, the group is deeply, and allegedly increasingly, involved in illicit economies, particularly the smuggling of mineral resources such as gold. There are several countries in West and central Africa that could prove fertile ground for Wagner’s potential expansion, both military and economic, in 2023.

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About this issue

The year 2022 was a tumultuous one for West Africa and the Sahel. The region was hit by a major cost-of-living crisis caused in large part by the knock-on effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as mass protests in a number of West African countries in response to, among other things, said crisis. As citizens are hit by record levels of inflation, damaging formal economic opportunities, illicit economies remain crucial sources of livelihoods.

Conflict and violence have remained the predominant threats in several key states in the Sahel, with Burkina Faso and Mali still the epicentres. However, northern areas of several coastal states, such as Benin and Togo, have also become more affected, with a marked acceleration in attacks in both countries believed to be by violent extremist groups. As illicit economies continue to flourish in the region, there is an increasing overlap between conflict zones and areas of illicit activity, with conflict actors often playing an important role in some illicit activities.¹

In this issue of the Observatory of Illicit Economies in West Africa’s Risk Bulletin, we take a look at key trends shaping the relationship between illicit economies and armed conflict and instability across West Africa and the Sahel. The first two articles focus on illicit economies that are particularly relevant when analyzing the impact of organized crime on conflict and instability in the region. Focusing specifically on key trends and the ways in which they evolved throughout 2022, we examine kidnap for ransom, notably its geographic diffusion; the cocaine trade, and how it intersected with politics in 2022, and appears poised to continue this trend in 2023; and finally, the illicit gold trade, looking particularly at state responses to the illicit economy.

The second story dives deeper into the issue of cattle rustling in Nigeria and Mali, where recent shifts in criminal dynamics solidified in 2022. In central and northern Mali, cattle rustling has increased since the beginning of 2022, and there are clear indicators that it will remain a central element in the financing and governance strategies of armed groups throughout 2023. In Nigeria, a country severely affected by armed bandits and increasing intercommunal violence, as well as by violent extremist groups, incidents of cattle rustling began to emerge more and more in several southern states. Furthermore, a number of risk factors associated with past cattle rustling surges in the north – namely, intensifying competition and tensions between herders and farming communities – are increasingly present in the south-west. Given the complex intertwining of the illicit economy and ethnic tensions, armed groups and violence, in addition to cattle rustling’s nature as an often-overlooked criminal phenomenon, this is our illicit market to watch for conflict in 2023.

We then shift our attention to some of the different actors involved in illicit economies in the context of conflict and violence. Across the region, violent extremist groups have remained a central element in conflict dynamics and growing players in a wide range of illicit economies. Having consolidated its presence in most of the central Sahel, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) has now firmly established itself as the dominant non-state armed actor in the regional conflict. Throughout 2022, JNIM continued to successfully exploit illicit economies as a means of garnering support from local communities. Whether the group can replicate this strategy in new areas it seeks to control ­– namely, northern Benin – remains to be seen, and 2023 will test its credibility as an alternative governance provider there.

JNIM isn’t the only actor that has sought, and will undoubtedly continue to seek, to expand its zone of influence and operations in West Africa. Foreign actors play an important role in the economic (both licit and illicit), political and security landscapes in the region. Throughout 2022, perhaps the most important foreign actor involved in (and some would argue contributing to) the conflict in the Sahel is the Russian state and the Wagner Group, a private military company (and recently designated ‘transnational criminal organization’ by the US government’) with strong links to Putin’s regime, whose troops have been deployed in Mali for over a year. Mass protests in Mali and neighbouring Burkina Faso have shone a light on the anti-French sentiment that has been brewing, to a degree cultivated through a coordinated effort by Russian actors, for many years.

The mercenary organization has rapidly become the most influential form of Russian engagement in Africa. As investigations into Wagner’s activities show, the group is deeply, and allegedly increasingly, involved in illicit economies, particularly the smuggling of mineral resources such as gold. There are several countries in West and central Africa that could prove fertile ground for Wagner’s potential expansion, both military and economic, in 2023.

It is clear that illicit economies and conflict intersect in complex ways. As conflict continues to unfold throughout 2023, it is crucial to monitor trends in key illicit economies that could fuel further violence and instability.

Notes