Decreasing tensions between peace agreement signatory groups in Mali may benefit trafficking flows.

In a leaked confidential letter sent from Malian transitional authorities to the head of the international mediation team on 24 February 2023, the government accused the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (Coordination of Azawad Movements ­– CMA, an alliance of rebel groups) of behaving in a way that is ‘an obstacle to peace’.¹ The letter claimed there had been 11 violations of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement (among them a series of securitization operations, such as the reopening of checkpoints and conducting of patrols in Mali’s northern regions of Kidal, Gao, Ménaka and Timbuktu) and broadly alleged that there was growing collusion between the CMA and terrorist groups.²

The letter also questioned the credibility of the international mediation team,³ and concluded that ‘the government, while remaining committed to the intelligent implementation of the agreement, will automatically reject any accusation that it is responsible for the possible consequences of its violation’.⁴ This has been interpreted by some, including members of the CMA, to be a ‘not so well-hidden threat’.⁵

This letter comes within a broader context of increasing tensions between signatory armed groups and the military government, including the December 2022 decision of the CMA and Plateforme des Mouvements du 14 Juin 2014 d’Alger (Algiers Platform of 14 June 2014 ­– ‘Plateforme’, a coalition of pro-government armed groups from northern Mali) to suspend their participation in the peace agreement’s monitoring committee, citing the lack of political will on the part of the transitional authorities.⁶

Some, including a member of the national transitional council, the legislative organ during Mali’s transition, believe that the resumption of hostilities is inevitable.⁷ Elements within the CMA are increasingly frustrated, with one member interviewed in Gao saying that they ‘are not afraid of these threats and we are just waiting for them [the Malian military forces] on the battlefield’.⁸ After almost eight years of frustration with the slow implementation of the 2015 peace agreement, the CMA member has concluded that ‘enough is enough’.⁹

In contrast to these growing tensions, signatory groups in northern Mali are increasingly aligned. We consider how these important shifts in relationships – between the military government and within distinct signatory groups – affect northern Mali’s trafficking dynamics, in which signatory armed groups play a major role.

How politics, peace processes and illicit interests intertwine in northern Mali

Illicit economies, armed conflict and state interests have long been intimately linked in northern Mali. Since the 1990s, when hashish began transiting the region, long-standing informal trading patterns have become overlayed with routes for trafficking higher value commodities, including cocaine (since the initial years of the 2000s) and gold (from about 2011).¹⁰ More structured networks have evolved around these commodities, with higher profits starting to penetrate the political infrastructure of the Malian state.

The 2012 crisis – when Tuareg rebel groups took up arms against the government, with the support of violent extremist groups – forced these networks to widen their allegiances.¹¹ Profits from illicit economies fed into the insurgency, and networks later allied themselves with powerful armed groups, including signatory groups (CMA and Plateforme).¹² Reflecting the connection between trafficking and the separatist uprising in the 2010s, one former smuggler in Gao noted: ‘Trafficking drugs became a real mindset in that period and a strategic asset to support or oppose the Azawad liberation.’¹³

Figure 1 Key actors in the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement.

At the time of the signing of the peace agreement in 2015, clashes continued between signatory groups, including over access to and control of trafficking routes.¹⁴

Despite trafficking being a clear source of instability in northern Mali, and posing a broader threat due to the vested interests of state elements in the revenues stemming from illicit economies,¹⁵ the topic was deliberately avoided during the negotiation of the 2015 peace agreement.¹⁶ The topic was deemed too sensitive, including for the mediation team, which could not openly address it.¹⁷ This is partly because, according to the UN, many negotiating parties themselves had trafficking interests.¹⁸ While the stalemate of the peace agreement almost eight years after its signing is the result of several factors, one important obstacle to its implementation is that parties to the agreement may benefit financially (whether directly or indirectly) from revenues derived from illicit economies. Therefore, in the words of a UN diplomat in Bamako, ‘no one wants to let it go’.¹⁹

Evolution of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement

While the subject of illicit economies was taboo during the Algiers peace negotiation, the insecurity and violence stemming from trafficking was of concern to signatory groups. ‘Too many weapons means too much tension … means too much violence. All of this is bad for business and, ultimately, everyone loses,’ noted a drug smuggler from Tabankort.²⁰ Tensions resulting from trafficking led the signatory groups to engage in the Anéfis talks, a series of three pacts signed in October 2015, October 2017 and January 2021 – each time following clashes between the two signatory groups (CMA and Plateforme) for control of strategic locations or checkpoints along vital smuggling routes.²¹ In contrast to the peace agreement, the Anéfis pacts were a series of non-aggression agreements between northern Mali’s political, security and economic elites, negotiated without the government or the international community (although the latter did discreetly provide logistical support for the organization of the discussions).²² The Anéfis pacts are among the few local instruments to have helped reduce the intensity and severity of clashes directly or indirectly linked to trafficking in the region – with the pacts directly affecting trafficking flows and who controls them.²³ As local agreements tend to influence illicit economies, the fusion of the CMA and the group’s greater cooperation with the Plateforme (within the CSP-PSD) may have a similar effect, reducing tensions and positively impacting trafficking.

Although the number of documented clashes related to illicit economies seems to have decreased in the last two years, this does not suggest that trafficking is in decline, or even that signatory groups are no longer involved in trafficking schemes. Paradoxically, the current situation in north-eastern Mali, marked by violent clashes between Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) and signatory groups and the end of the French presence, has in some cases meant greater convergence between signatory groups and, to some extent, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM).²⁴ While clashes used to regularly take place between JNIM and signatory groups, since 2021, they have agreed to a détente. This means that they do not directly attack each other, and that the CMA does not collaborate with international forces.²⁵

Strengthened alliances amid growing tensions

Since the second coup in May 2021, relations between previously conflicting signatory armed groups have warmed in parallel to growing tensions between the military government in Bamako and the CMA, calling into question the future of the peace agreement. The CMA and the Plateforme have joined to form the Cadre stratégique permanent pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement (Permanent strategic framework for peace, security and development ­– CSP-PSD). The CSP-PSD is a coalition with the official goals of coordinating efforts to implement the agreement, protecting the population through a joint security mechanism, and enhancing economic and social cooperation in the north.

The growing alliances between signatory groups operating in the north and JNIM throughout 2022 has in large part been driven by a common threat – IS Sahel. IS Sahel has intensified its operations in the Gao and Ménaka regions, benefiting, among other things, from the withdrawal of French troops by the end of August 2022. The Malian armed forces are broadly perceived not to have responded to this growing threat (apart from conducting a small number of airstrikes).²⁶

Stepping into the security gap, in February 2023, the CSP-PSD conducted a large-scale securitization operation in the south of Kidal, mobilizing over 2 500 people. For many, this demonstrated that both coalitions (rebel and pro-government groups) are the main players in protecting communities against threats in Mali’s northern territories.²⁷ In addition, the CMA announced the merger of its three components in February, unifying its armed forces under a single command to better respond to increased insecurity in northern Mali.²⁸

While both developments suggest a strengthening of the CMA and the Plateforme, it is too early to conclusively determine how the shifting security landscape will impact illicit economies in northern Mali. However, preliminary analysis suggests that decreasing tensions between signatory groups may benefit trafficking flows. This is line with trends over the past decade, in which episodes of political turmoil in Bamako (such as coups) have had a more limited impact on illicit economies in northern Mali, while relationships between signatory groups and levels of violence in northern Mali and along trafficking routes are key factors affecting trafficking flows.²⁹

Bilal Agh Cherif, secretary general of the Coordination of Azawad Movements, signs a preliminary peace agreement in Algiers, 14 May 2015.

Photo: Reuters/Alamy Stock Photo

Looking forward: Impacts on illicit economies

It is not yet clear what effect the fusion of the CMA, and the coordination of large-scale securitization operations by the CSP-PSD, will have on illicit economies in northern Mali. However, interviews conducted in February and March 2023 with members of signatory armed groups, transporters and smugglers indicate that all these stakeholders expect that growing collaboration will be good for the business of smugglers and traffickers, bringing greater cohesiveness to checkpoints and lowering risks of attack by rival groups.³⁰ ‘The more [signatory groups] pool their resources together, the less incentive there will be for clashes,’ noted a senior member of the negotiation team.³¹

For example, since late 2021, the CSP-PSD has been controlling N’tahaka mine – the largest artisanal gold mining site in Gao region – establishing checkpoints nearby and conducting patrols. Before the CSP-PSD takeover, no armed group was controlling the mine, and the site was regularly infiltrated by several unidentified groups, as well as bandits and IS Sahel.³² The arrival of the CSP-PSD resulted in decreased insecurity and banditry events, such as armed robberies,³³ though the group was not able to fully protect the mine and the workers, according to a CSP member.³⁴ In the confidential 24 February letter, the government denounced the securitization of the N’thaka mine (and others in northern Kidal, without naming them) as violating the peace agreement, as the mine site is considered illegal by the authorities. Meanwhile, most of the people working on the mine see the arrival of the CSP-PSD as a positive development, and feel more secure coming to work.³⁵

The enhanced coordination of groups within the CMA, and within the CSP-PSD, is expected to decrease tensions over smuggling routes and especially the taxation of these routes. Taxing the passage of licit or illicit goods (such as fuel or weapons) and human smuggling flows is a main source of financing for armed groups. A member of the CMA explained that 40% of the taxation at a given checkpoint goes to the general funds of the group, 40% to vehicles (logistics, maintenance and refuelling of vehicles at the checkpoint) and 20% to the members of the group manning the checkpoint.³⁶ The more autonomy and freedom to operate checkpoints and to allow for the movement of goods and people, the better.

The impasse of the implementation of the peace agreement appears to have had little impact on illicit economies in northern Mali. However, while clashes between the signatory groups seem unlikely, the possibility of resumption of hostilities between the government and the signatory groups is not to be discounted. If this happens, armed confrontation is likely to curb trafficking flows, but illicit economies will remain central to resourcing the operations of signatory armed groups.

Notes