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Observatory of Illicit Economies in West Africa
Summary highlights
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Arms trafficking routes into northern Mali have been disrupted. Why has this happened and what are the implications?
Since mid-2023, arms trafficking routes into northern Mali have been severely disrupted following a major offensive by Malian forces and their then-allies, the Russian Wagner Group, triggering intense clashes with rebel groups. The disruption has driven up prices for illicit weapons, and forced traffickers to seek alternative routes and weapons sources. Meanwhile, new types of weapons have proliferated, such as drones. Rising arms prices and the emergence of new smuggling routes underscore the persistent demand for weapons among armed groups in the region. This carries significant implications for stability across the Sahel, as arms trafficking plays a key role in shaping the regional conflict landscape.
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Cinkassé cattle market in Togo — closed due to fears it was being used to launder stolen cattle — reopened under strict reforms, but risks persist.
The GI-TOC’s 2025 illicit hub mapping initiative identifies cattle rustling as one of the most destabilizing criminal markets in the Sahel and West Africa. Cattle rustling develops particularly in areas increasingly affected by violent extremist organizations (VEOs), including key hubs such as Cinkassé in Togo. When authorities closed the Cinkassé cattle market in October 2024, they targeted a major hub for cattle trade between Burkina Faso, Togo and Ghana. The closure was triggered by allegations that the market was being used to launder stolen livestock and financing VEOs, most prominently the al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM, which uses markets in coastal states to sell livestock it steals in the Sahel. A month later, Cinkassé market reopened with fewer brokers, stricter rules for tracing cattle, and stronger oversight from the authorities and management. These changes make it a test case for regulating the regional cattle trade.
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Lakurawa is rapidly expanding its territory and revenue in North West Nigeria, and may contribute to a long-feared bridge between Nigerian and Sahelian armed groups.
Lakurawa, an armed group in North West Nigeria with reported ties to Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), has intensified its violence since January 2025, causing numerous deaths and mass displacement in Sokoto and Kebbi states. Lakurawa sustains itself through several illicit revenue streams, including cattle rustling, extortion disguised as Islamic almsgiving (zakat), kidnapping for ransom, and fuel theft from cross-border pipelines and black-market traders. With at least 1 000 fighters and expanding territorial presence, Lakurawa poses a strategic threat as a potential bridge between Sahelian extremist groups and those in Nigeria. This connection could facilitate sharing of resources, combatants and finances between ISGS and Islamic State West Africa Province. Disrupting Lakurawa’s diversified income sources is crucial for weakening the group and preventing further extremist encroachment into coastal West Africa.
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JNIM’s blockade in south-west Mali illustrates the strategic importance of controlling key licit and illicit supply routes for operational, financial and political gain.
The fuel blockade in southern and south-western Mali by JNIM since September 2025 exposed how control of roads is central to the political economy of conflict in West Africa. In targeting fuel convoys and major national roads linking Mali to coastal states, JNIM seeks to demonstrate its strength and the military junta’s weakness by asphyxiating Bamako’s economy. In addition to manipulating road access as a political lever, JNIM, other armed groups and criminal networks more broadly exploit road infrastructure in different ways. Findings from the 2025 illicit hub mapping in West Africa show that 87% of illicit hubs are near major roads, underscoring how transport corridors enable licit and illicit flows of goods — from gold and fuel to weapons and drugs. Roads provide armed groups with critical operational resources and revenue streams, while serving as spaces of governance and coercion. As violence and extortion cluster along these corridors, reclaiming West Africa’s roads through fair, transparent and secure systems of mobility is essential to restoring stability and legitimate economic circulation.
About this issue
The 13th issue of the Risk Bulletin of Illicit Economies in West Africa explores the interdependent relationship between illicit economies and armed conflict. The research presented in this issue draws on the findings of the GI-TOC’s 2025 illicit hub mapping in West Africa, a region-wide study analyzing the geography of illicit economies and their intersections with conflict.
The 2025 mapping, which updates a previous iteration released in 2022, provides a snapshot of illicit economy dynamics across the region. It also presents the findings of the Illicit Economies and Instability Monitor (IEIM), an expert-led tool that provides a quantitative assessment of the degree to which illicit economies fuel violence and instability, providing policymakers with clear insights as to the major crime–conflict nodes in the region. The IEIM provides a score and classification for each hub, and identifies those that fuel conflict and violence the most.
This overarching study found that some illicit economies play a far bigger role in shaping instability than others. Five specific illicit economies — kidnapping, cattle rustling, the illicit arms trade, the illicit gold trade, and extortion and protection racketeering — are particularly significant in shaping the regional conflict landscape. We describe these as ‘accelerant markets’.
The articles in this issue of the risk bulletin unpack how these accelerant markets are underpinning conflict. For example, Lakurawa, an armed group in North West Nigeria, has been able to expand its operations and number of fighters dramatically in recent months. A key factor enabling its rise has been its exploitation of several illicit revenue streams, including cattle rustling, extortion, kidnapping for ransom and fuel theft.
Yet action can be taken to stem the accelerant action of these markets. One such example is the reforms implemented at Cinkassé cattle market in Togo, which was believed to be used to launder stolen livestock and financing armed groups, including the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM). JNIM uses markets in coastal states to sell thousands of livestock it steals in the Sahel. Reforms implemented at Cinkassé to improve traceability of livestock give a case study of how markets exploited by illicit actors can be reformed.
Illicit markets, however, can prove resilient in the face of government action. For example, arms trafficking routes into northern Mali from Libya were severely disrupted following a major offensive by Malian forces and their then-allies, the Russian Wagner Group, in 2023. Former arms trafficking hubs came under government control and movement of illicit weapons became more difficult. However, armed groups have adapted to seek different weapons sources and trafficking routes.
One lens through which to look at these accelerant markets and other forms of illicit trade is through geography, and the shared routes through which they pass. In West Africa and the Sahel, road routes are key corridors for trade, whether licit or illicit. This means that control of road routes is a source of power for government and armed groups alike. The fuel blockade of southern and south-western Mali by JNIM has exposed how control of roads has become central to the political economy of conflict in West Africa.
These articles show how certain illicit economies in West Africa are a key factor shaping regional conflict. Through the risk bulletin, the illicit hub mapping and other studies, the GI-TOC seeks to provide analysis that captures these evolving dynamics.